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I. ABSTRACT
Under an unequivocally clear federal law, marijuana is
considered a Schedule I controlled substance--the most dangerous
type of substance recognized by the federal government in the
Controlled Substances Abuse Act of 1970 (CSA).' Under the CSA,
possession of any marijuana is a misdemeanor and cultivation is a
felony.2 However, California and twelve other states have passed
laws that legalize the use of marijuana for medical purposes. 3
Additionally, the California Attorney General and the United States
Attorney General (as the officers charged with the duty of enforcing
state and federal laws, respectively) have decided to sidestep and gut
the congressional mandate embodied in the CSA.4 With the adoption
* Daniel Mortensen is a second year student at Pepperdine University School
of Law. Daniel graduated from Ponoma College with a Bacholor of Arts in
Politics, with a minor in Philosophy. First, thank you to those closest to me who
have not only put up with me, but who have unwaveringly supported me through
this article-writing process and the chaos and lumps of law school in general: Mom,
Dad, Andy, Megan, and Erin. Second, thank you to my editors, the real heroes and
voices of reason in this work, for your time and energy: Christian Nickerson, Holly
Key, Molly Horan, Anson Cain, and the rest of the NAALJ staff. This work is
dedicated in loving memory to Buster Douglas and Wesley J. Snipes.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)-(b) (2006).
3. Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington make up those
thirteen. ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.10 (2007); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.5 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 0-4-287 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. §
329-121 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.26421 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-1 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §
453A.010 (2008); N.M. STAT. § 30-31C-1 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.300
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-21-28.6 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4471 (2003);
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.51 A.005 (2007).
4. See CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR THE
SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION OF MARIJUANA GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE, Aug.
2008,
http://ag.ca.gov/cms attachments/press/pdfs/n 1601_medicalmarijuanaguidelines.pd
f/ (establishing the California Attorney General's official policy of marijuana
enforcement in the state of California); see also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE
OF MARIJUANA, Oct. 19, 2009, http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192/
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of half-hearted and toothless enforcement policies, these officers
have neglected their law enforcement responsibilities and ignored the
findings of regulatory agencies pertaining to the dangers of
marijuana.5 Furthermore, over the course of a few key rulings, the
United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the federal
government has the power to overturn the types of state statutes
legalizing marijuana use for both medical and non-medical
purposes. 6 However, because the Court is not in the business of law
enforcement, the Gonzales v. Raich opinion could not act as a
mandate to compel more stringent enforcement of federal drug laws.'
Rather, the enforcement arm of the federal government exists in the
executive branch in the form of federal prosecutors (in the United
States Department of Justice) and executive agencies (like the Drug
Enforcement Administration). The Raich opinion held that it is
legally within the rights of those with legitimate enforcement
authority to crack down on marijuana abusers and distributors, even
if the abusers and distributors are in compliance with state laws;
therefore, even though the Court does not have enforcement
authority, its ruling demonstrates that these types of state laws are not
recognized as being truly legitimate. 9
With California state law directly contradicting federal law,
California has suffered a steady barrage of federal raids on marijuana
users, grow houses, and dispensaries since the Compassionate Use
(establishing the United States Attorney General's official policy of enforcement of
federal marijuana laws in states with medical marijuana statutes).
5. See MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, supra note
4 (demonstrating the federal government's half-hearted enforcement policy).
6. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 31 (2005).
7. Id.
8. See United STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OUR MISSION STATEMENT,
http://www.justice.gov/02organizations/about.html (articulating the Department of
Justice's mission statement, in the broadest sense, as "enforc[ing] the law and
defend[ing] the interests of the United States according to the law"); see also
UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEA MISSION
STATEMENT, http://www.justice.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm (stating that the
"mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is to enforce the
controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the
criminal and civil justice system of the United States . . . those ... involved in the
growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances.").
9. Raich, 545 U.S. at 31.
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Act (CUA) was passed in 1996.10 This direct conflict of federal and
state law raises serious issues of due process rights-with state
governments telling their citizens one thing only to have those
citizens suffer federal prosecutions later. As federal raids become
more frequent in California and as economic conditions have become
increasingly desperate both state-wide and nation-wide, a perfect
storm is looming. The federal government must stop avoiding this
issue and instead must concretely decide how it is going to deal with
state laws that directly contradict their own. The federal government
either needs to (1) attack state laws and ramp-up enforcement on
marijuana use, possession, and sales; or (2) legalize the substance and
then regulate the content, safety, and sale of marijuana as a
consumable item. If legalized, the states and the federal government
must work together in crafting better-defined laws and regulatory
mechanisms so that the full scope of this substance's impact on
American society can be successfully regulated, overseen, and
enforced.
The marijuana topic is polarizing on three main fronts: political,
social, and economic. Politically, this is an extremely touchy issue."
10. See Teri Figueroa, Affidavits Offer Reasons for Pot Raids: Three North
County Medical Marijuana Dispensaries Hit Last Month, N. CoUNTY TIMES, Oct.
10, 2009, available at
http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/sdcounty/article_945665ec-cO39-5e4f-b723-
0e6685f3f22c.html (discussing and providing commentary on a few very recent
raids on medical marijuana dispensaries in southern California); see also John
Hoeffel, All L.A. County Medical Pot Dispensaries Face Prosecution, District
Attorney Says, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 2009, available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/1 0/cooley-says-pot-dispensaries-will-
be-prosecuted.html (reporting on the Los Angeles County District Attorney's
recent shift in policy with respect to California medical marijuana); see also John
Hoeffel, Pot Dispensaries Sue L.A. over Moratorium: Medical Marijuana
Collectives' Suit Comes as City Struggles to Write a New Ordinance, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2009, at Al, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/23/local/me-pot-suit23 (describing the
backlash from California medical marijuana users recently facing more hostility
from law enforcement agencies); see also John Hoeffel, Los Angeles County D.A.
Prepares to Crack Down on Pot Outlets, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at Al, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/09/local/me-medical-marijuana9 (reiterating
the Los Angeles County District Attorney's serious policy position of cracking
down on medical marijuana).
I1. See Patrick Stack, Medical Marijuana: A History, TIME MAG., Oct. 27,
2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/covers/1 101021104/history.html
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Some groups are morally opposed to the abuse of controlled
substances: they view the legalization of marijuana as endorsing the
behavior and legitimizing the substance, gutting our wholesome
American society of its morals and sending improper signals to future
generations.12 Further complicating this issue are powerful and well-
endowed interest groups falling on both sides of the "War-on-Drugs"
debate, which constantly politicize the issue and stir up conflict.'3
Socially, in terms of evolving societal norms in many pockets of
American society, the use of marijuana is coming into the
mainstream and is shedding its stigma as being an illicit drug in the
traditional sense.14 Economically, both the state of California and
our nation as a whole are in financial shambles." As such, state and
federal governments are both actively searching for alternative
(tracing the history of the politics of marijuana from as early as 2737 B.C. up to
modem American society).
12. See Mike Thompson, Why Christians Should Oppose Use of Marituana,
THE NEWS HERALD, Mar. 5, 2009, available at
http://www2.morganton.com/content/2009/mar/05/why-christians-should-oppose-
use-marijuana! (explaining that, regardless of the steam marijuana is gaining in the
realm of mainstream American society, Christians still maintain that marijuana is a
mind-controlling substance and thus is morally wrong and inconsistent with their
beliefs).
13. See Kelley Vlahos, Marijuana Lobby Grows in Sophistication,
FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 28, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,145534,00.html (describing the political
warfare and interest groups involved in the medical marijuana debate).
14. See Adam Tschom, Marituana's New High Life, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/30/image/ig-potculture30
("Cannabis is moving into the mainstream, with fashion, films, TV and politicians
acknowledging it's here to stay.").
15. See Stephen Moore, California's 'Green Jobs' Experiment Isn't Going
Well, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at A9, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123336500319935517.html (demonstrating
California's situation: "California's unemployment rate hit 9.3% in December
[2009], up from 4.9% in December 2006. There are now 1.5 million Californians
out of work. The state has . . . lost more businesses than any state in recent years,
and is facing a $40 billion deficit."); see also THE ECONOMIST, The Stimulus That
Should Have Been, Dec. 1, 2009,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/12/thestimulus-thatshould
_have/; Kelly Evans, Hard-Hit Families Finally Start Saving, Aggravating
Nation's Economic Woes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123120525879656021.html (discussing our
nation's collective economic woes).
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methods to generate revenue.16 Because marijuana presents itself as
a convenient coffer, marijuana seems to be on the short-list of many
state and federal lawmakers' as an untapped source of revenue.1 7
This issue is a political pundit's dream: it is a trifecta full of
hand-wringing and speculating. Because a legalized market for
marijuana is such a new and untested proposition in America,
commentators are only able to offer sheer speculation. However,
since these opinions are incapable of being properly tested, everyone
is able to assume that his or her assertions are correct. Until reliable
fact-finders are able to smoke out the truth from the myths, everyone
is correct and nothing is accomplished. The cable news networks
win, but Californians and Americans lose.
With political, social, and economic tensions, both state-wide and
nation-wide, creating this perfect storm, the issue of marijuana in
American society demands the careful and close attention of our
lawmakers. Right now, although lines have been drawn in the sand,
those lines are flimsy and subject to political, social, and economic
pressures. In other words, the lines that have been drawn are really
policy positions-positions that are often rooted in political
convenience and often temporary in nature, being used as stall tactics
16. See Justin Ewers, Schwarzenegger Hints at Raising Taxes, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 15, 2008,
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/politics/2008/05/15/schwarzenegger-hints-
at-raising-taxes.html (analyzing California's active search for new streams of
revenue); see also Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Says Deficit Action is Key, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 26, 2010, at A2, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704479404575087290468927762.
html?mod=WSJ economy LeftTopHighlights (discussing the federal
government's approach for stabilizing the economy).
17. See Richard Gonzales, Legitimacy of Pot Tax Revenue Remains Hazy,
N.P.R., Apr. 3, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=89349791 (describing
California tax collectors' recent discussions regarding the largely untapped and
healthy revenue stream attached to marijuana sales); see also American Civil
Liberties Union, Members of Congress ask DEA to Stop Obstructing Medical
Mariuana Research, Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.aclu.org/drug-law-
reform/members-congress-ask-dea-stop-obstructing-medical-marijuana-research/
(demonstrating the trend that federal lawmakers, both Democrats and Republicans,
are fairly open to the idea of bringing marijuana into the American mainstream for
revenue-generating purposes).
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more than anything else. These types of lines can easily be washed
away by politically-convenient high tides.
As Californians and Americans wait in a perpetual holding
pattern for a concrete resolution to this issue, marijuana-using
Californians are left unprotected and exposed. Instead of having
laws serve their most basic and traditional function of putting
individuals in society on notice of prohibited activities and societal
expectations, all of the recent statements and memorandums released
by those with enforcement authority act merely as policy positions.' 8
In order to protect the due process rights of Californians, as well as
all other Americans, and in order to put all relevant parties on fair
notice, laws must be passed. Mere policy positions cannot carry the
day.
The enforcement of our nation's established laws and the
adjudication and administration of justice in our country should not
be contingent upon who is in the White House, who is appointed to
key positions in the Justice Department, or who is confirmed as
Attorney General. As a bedrock of American constitutional tradition
and American federal constitutional structure, the legislative branch
is charged with lawmaking, while the executive branch is charged
with the faithful enforcement or execution of those laws. 19 However,
with respect to the issue of state medical marijuana statutes, the
federal executive branch has engaged in unofficial lawmaking, not
law enforcement.20 With the adoption of their "policies" of
enforcement, President Obama and the United States Attorney
General have commandeered the federal legislative process and have
fundamentally changed the scope and spirit of the CSA.2 1
18. See GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION OF MARIJUANA
GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE, supra note 4 (establishing the California Attorney
General's official policy of marijuana enforcement in the state of California); see
also MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, supra note 4
(establishing the United States Attorney General's official policy of enforcement of
federal marijuana laws in states with medical marijuana statutes).
19. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (granting Congress the legislative power to
pass laws); see also U.S. CONST. art. II (charging the executive branch with, among
other things, preserving and protecting the Constitution).
20. Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys, supra note 4.
21. See id. (articulating the United States Attorney General's official policy of
marijuana enforcement); see also Devlin Barrett, Feds Issue New Medical
Marifuana Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2009, available at
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Flimsy policy positions are not enough; they are subject to
political whims. Rather, truly legitimate approaches to enforcement
should be bolstered by or rooted in some type of clearly defined and
tangible law. A system of enforcement built upon foundations of
policy rather than law is weak, unstable, ripe for corruption and
inconsistency, and perpetually on the brink of collapse. In this
comment, after establishing some general introductory and
background information,22 I want to use the state of California (being
the first state to adopt a medical marijuana statute in 1996) as a
model to explore the following topics: (1) Who is regulating,
monitoring, and enforcing the marijuana laws in California?23 (2)
How successful are they in their regulatory or administrative
capacity? 24 (3) What are the ramifications of states passing laws that
are in direct defiance of expressly mandated federal laws and
regulations? 25 (4) What types of federal administrative authorities are
invoked by states enacting these defiant laws?26
II. INTRODUCTION
A recent wave of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) raids
on grow-houses and "medical" marijuana dispensaries in more
conservative California counties has brought into question the
legitimacy of California's Compassionate Use Act (CUA), 27 which
legalizes marijuana for medical purposes for card-carrying
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=8859286/ (establishing President
Obama as being very supportive of the Attorney General's official policy of
enforcement).
22. See infra Parts II-IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part V.A. 1.
25. See infra Part V.A.2.
26. See generally infra Part V.
27. See Figueroa, supra note 10; see also Hoeffel, All L.A. County Medical
Pot Dispensaries Face Prosecution, District Attorney Says, supra note 10; see also
Hoeffel, Pot Dispensaries Sue L.A. over Moratorium: Medical Marijuana
Collectives' Suit Comes as City Struggles to Write a New Ordinance, supra note
10; see also Hoeffel, Los Angeles County D.A. Prepares to Crack Down on Pot
Outlets, supra note 10.
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Californians. 28 This has triggered a robust debate nation-wide, state-
wide, and within my own household.
As a California native growing up in a family of police officers, I
have grown up with a law enforcement mentality, vocabulary, and
outlook.29 If I had to bet, I would say that I was probably the only
ten-year-old on the block with a police scanner cemented to his
nightstand, listening to his dad respond to calls during graveyard
shifts. This mentality, however, seems to run counter to the always-
evolving contemporary societal values both state-wide and nation-
wide. Furthermore, it clashes with the mentalities of many of my
peers and the youth of today. In fact, although my family is blue-
collar and filled with police officers, many of the friends I have made
over the years are, for lack of a more eloquent label, habitual pot-
smoking stoners. 30
For the purpose of full disclosure, although I have had a foot in
each world-or in each culture, I have never used marijuana.
Therefore, anything written in this comment is not reflective of my
own personal experiences with the substance. However, although I
cannot give a firsthand account of the effects of the substance, I can
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006).
29. As a southern California native originally from San Diego County, I have
spent my entire life in California. With a father who is a police officer, a mother
who owns a small construction company, and two uncles who are retired captains
from separate Los Angeles County law enforcement agencies, I am the youngest of
three children. As a family, we have fairly simple and straightforward ambitions:
we want to work hard, we want to be proud of that work, and we want that work to
matter. We like to think of ourselves as fairly blue-collar, and we tend to approach
issues from a "law-and-order" disposition.
30. In the summer of 2009, while I was clerking for the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Long Beach office, I rented a room from my best friend from
high school (we can call him "John Doe"), who was a student living in Long
Beach. He is a card-carrying-medical marijuana user who received his medical
marijuana card from his doctor for the purpose of easing his fictitious "insomnia."
Twice a month, Doe took his unemployment check to his "dispensary/collective"
and returned with a jar of marijuana. While I was voluntarily working forty or
more unpaid hours a week at the D.A.'s office, his pot-smoking, drinking, and
lounging habits were being supplemented by the same state and county to which I
was volunteering my services. The dynamics of the situation were laughably
ironic!
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provide firsthand observations of the substance's impact on the lives
of my friends, family, and acquaintances.
Since I am not a user, what is it about marijuana that intrigues
me? Am I morally or religiously opposed to the substance? I would
not go that far, as I have close friends and family members who
partake. Am I concerned about some of the damaging ramifications
associated with frequent use, or habitual abuse, of the substance?
That is probably closer to my level of objection to the drug, an
objection I levy towards not only marijuana but also a number of
substances or vices that are harmful when abused. However, for me
personally, it boils down to an issue of respect. Social science
studies, economic revenue projections, and medical health studies
aside, I come from a family which respects and reveres the rule of
law. I have a great respect for my police officer uncles, and an even
greater respect for my parents. When my parents told me at a very
young age, around the time of the standard "birds and bees" speech,
to not drink or do drugs, I listened. As I matured and began forming
my own opinions, I was able to see things a bit clearer. I have been
able to observe and recognize that smoking a joint will probably not
kill you. However, out of respect for what my dad does for a living,
out of respect for my family's values, and as a matter of my own
physical health and well-being, I have still chosen to abstain..
One of the reasons I choose to abstain is the primary reason I
chose to take on the task of writing a comment on this topic-my dad.
With pundits and commentators hammering out the "legalize-it"
debate on a weekly basis, and with a long line of seemingly annual
California initiatives on the ballot seeking to legalize marijuana, 31
started a discussion with my dad. Surprisingly, the man I have
viewed as "Mr. Law-and-Order" for the last twenty years threw me a
curve ball. During our discussion, my dad unequivocally announced
his belief that marijuana should be legalized, saying he did not think
31. See Jessica Greene, Pot Vote: Legalizing Marijuana Could be on 2010
Ballot, NBC News - Bay Area, Dec. 15, 2009, http://
www.nbcbayarea.colm/news/politics/Pot-Legalization-Headed-for-2010-Ballot-
79304947.html (discussing a proposition likely to hit the October 2010 California
state ballot).
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it was worth the headache or tax dollars spent on the endless
enforcement efforts. 32
Although this was just one man's opinion, it was enough to get
me thinking about this topic. His stance on legalizing it was so
unexpected that my wheels began to chum over this topic, regarding
both the tug-of-war between California and federal regulatory
agencies and also the tensions between the marijuana enforcement
approaches in the more conservative California counties (i.e., San
Diego and Modoc) and the more liberal counties (i.e., Los Angeles,
Santa Cruz, Alameda, and San Francisco).33
This comment will address some of the most pressing social,
political, and economic issues linked to how state and federal
legislative bodies and executive regulatory agencies are currently
dealing with the issue of marijuana in our society-whether it means
treating it as an illegal substance, legalizing it for medical purposes,
or legalizing it for a wider variety of purposes. I will analyze the
current climate surrounding state-legalized medical marijuana
statutes, using the situation in California as a test group for the rest of
the country. Taking what we've learned from California, how should
the rest of the nation move forward?
1II. GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Currently, there are thirteen states with medical marijuana
statutes, all of which vary. 34 However, these state statutes legalizing
32. Essentially, he asserted what I dubbed as a "Bigger-Fish-To-Fry"
argument; from his experience at the ground level of law enforcement, he feels
there are far more serious criminals out there, and that those criminals should be
the ones that financially-beleaguered California cities and counties should spend
their scarce enforcement resources on.
33. See Voter Contact Services, California: Voter File,
http://bbs.vcsnet.com/State.php?CA+County+DA/ (presenting a compilation of
California voting habits and political demographics broken down by county).
34. See supra note 3. Generally, these states' respective medical marijuana
laws are targeted at or have the principle purpose of easing the pain of suffering
patients. Furthermore, all of the state statutes delineate what each state considers to
be "approved conditions" deserving of medical usage, with most statutory schemes
detailing what is considered to be legal amounts to possess for medical purposes.
While the states vary slightly and differ on certain line-drawing types of issues (i.e.,
what a particular state considers to be an approved condition, how much is allowed
in terms of possession, and what the mechanisms for control and enforcement are),
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the use of marijuana for medical purposes stand in direct
contradiction of federal law. 35 Because of the direct defiance shown
by those states rebuking federal law, political, social, and economic
tensions are mounting, and something has to give. As it currently
stands, Californians (and citizens of other states with medical-use
statutes) who utilize marijuana for medical purposes are acting in
violation of federal law. These Americans presently violating federal
law are in limbo and are waiting in a kind of calm-before-the-storm
of eventual federal action. Their respective states have said one
thing, the counties in those states have said something else, the
federal executive branch and its arm of enforcement agencies have
added yet another contradiction and wrinkle, and the federal judiciary
has also let its own distinctive voice be heard. In other words, all the
appropriate parties or authorized powers have chimed in and drawn
their respective lines in the sand. Now, it is just a matter of waiting
for some legitimate form of action to follow up on these blankly-
issued policy statements and all of this politically-convenient, hollow
saber rattling.
The following briefly maps out the crucial voices who have
spoken on this subject: (1) the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, (2) the United States Supreme Court, (3) the Obama
Administration and the United States Attorney General, and (4) the
California attorney general.
A. The Drug Enforcement Administration
The DEA continues to cling to the true spirit of the CSA, holding
that the CSA was enacted into law by the United States Congress as
part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970 in order to combat the use and possession of dangerous
substances.36 Title II of this Act was the CSA.37 The CSA is the
the spirit of the thirteen respective statutes remains the same. Furthermore, there
are two states, Arizona and Maryland, that have statutes favoring medical
marijuana usage, even though they do not fuilly legalize the medical use of
marijuana. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3401 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 5-601 (West 2008).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
37. Id.
30-1
United States' current federal drug policy under which the
manufacture, use, possession, distribution, and importation of certain
substances is regulated.38 Under the CSA's regulatory scheme, five
"schedules" were created-with each schedule defined as having
certain qualities and characteristics and with each schedule subject to
different degrees of punishment.39 All substances regulated in some
manner under the federal scheme are slotted under one of the five
schedules of the CSA.40
38. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006).
39. Id. For example, Schedule I substances are considered the most
dangerous, so Schedule I substance violations trigger the harshest punishments. Id.
40. Id. How does the scheduling of substances work? The CSA places all
substances that are in some manner regulated under existing federal law into one of
five schedules. Id. This placement is based upon the substance's medical use,
potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability. Id. The CSA provides a
mechanism for substances to be controlled-added to a schedule, decontrolled-
removed from control, and rescheduled-transferred from one schedule to another.
Id. Proceedings to add, delete, or change the previous schedule of a drug or other
substance may be initiated by the DEA, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), or by petition from any interested person. See UNITED STATES
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, CHAPTER 1: THE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT, http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/abuse/1-csa.htm (describing
the scheduling process). When a petition is received by the DEA, the agency
begins its own investigation of the drug. Id. The DEA also may begin an
investigation of a drug at any time based upon information received from law
enforcement laboratories, state and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies,
or other sources of information. Id. Once the DEA has collected the necessary
data, the DEA Administrator, by authority of the United States Attorney General,
requests from HHS a scientific and medical evaluation and recommendation as to
whether the drug or other substance should be controlled or removed from control.
Id. HHS solicits information from the Commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), evaluations and recommendations from the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, and on occasion from the scientific and medical
community at large. Id. The manner in which a substance is classified is often a
source of great public debate and unrest. See Aaron Gibson & David Joranson, Is
the DEA 's New "Prescription Series" Regulation Balanced?, 22 JOURNAL OF PAIN
& PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 218 (2008), available at
http://www.painpolicy.wisc.edu/DEA/Rx Series Adoption.pdf (discussing the
frequent critiques commonly launched at the logic behind scheduling and the
inconsistency of outcomes in the scheduling of substances under the CSA). Since
there is an element of discretion involved, and because the decisions can often
seem arbitrary or politicized, the slotting of substances is a hotly contested and
heavily scrutinized event. Id. In other words, both the process of specifically
classifying or scheduling any substance and also the larger concept of the CSA's
139
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Two federal agencies, the DEA and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), are the primary engines that determine which
substances are added or removed from the CSA's various
schedules. 4 1 Although the DEA has reluctantly fallen into lock-step
with the enforcement policies of United States Attorney General Eric
Holder and the Obama Administration,42 the DEA insists that
marijuana is still considered a Schedule I substance4 3 as defined by
the DEA and FDA under the CSA." As such, even though the DEA
is currently falling in line with the quasi-toothless enforcement
approaches articulated by Obama and the Justice Department, the
DEA remains committed to the core purpose of the CSA and reminds
the public that marijuana is still considered a Schedule I substance.45
Even though policies of enforcing the CSA are being adopted that
run counter to the CSA's mandate, the DEA alleges that the CSA is
core purpose as a regulatory and enforcement mechanism are often sources of huge
controversy, triggering constant debate as to the effectiveness of the CSA as both a
policy and set of procedures. Id. With the CSA standing as the poster child or the
face of the federal government's War-on-Drugs, a war many Americans feel is
being mismanaged or is altogether unnecessary, the CSA is usually under a
political microscope and subjected to constant scrutiny. Id.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006).
42. See infra Part III.C.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006).
44. See UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, MARIJUANA,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/conceri/marijuana.html (reaffirming that the DEA still
considers marijuana to be a Schedule I substance for purposes of the CSA); see
also UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, SCHEDULING OF DRUGS
UNDER THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT,
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucml 15087.htm (reaffirming that the
FDA still considers marijuana to be a Schedule I substance for CSA purposes).
The DEA and FDA describe Schedule I substances as being substances with high
potentials for abuse, with no currently accepted medical use for treatment in the
United States, and with a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other
substances under medical supervision. See MARIJUANA, supra note 44; see also
SCHEDULING OF DRUGS UNDER THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ACT, supra note 44.
Some examples of other Schedule I substances, in addition to marijuana, are
heroin, LSD, and methaqualone. See CHAPTER 1: THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
ACT, supra, note 40 (listing other Schedule I substances).
45. See CHAPTER 1: THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, supra, note 40
(reaffirming that, even though they are adopting an enforcement policy to the
contrary, the DEA still considers marijuana to be a Schedule I substance for CSA
purposes).
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as robust as ever.46 Saying you stand for one thing while actively
doing the opposite is either political lip-service at its finest or an
impressively disillusioned example of cognitive dissidence.
B. The United States Supreme Court
In 2005, in the case of Gonzales v. Raich, the Court held that the
federal government has the power to overturn laws passed at the state
level legalizing marijuana use and possession, even if those laws are
narrowly-tailored for medical purposes only.4 7 The Court reasoned
that marijuana as a substance was still considered illegal and
dangerous in the eyes of the federal government (noting that it
remained slotted as a Schedule I substance under the CSA), and as
such, it was within the purview of the federal government's authority
to disregard any state law saying otherwise. 48 Although the Court's
ruling did not mandate that the federal government had to overturn
all those state laws legalizing marijuana, it unequivocally gave the
federal government the power to overturn those state laws (whether
the state statutes were for medical purposes or not).49
46. Id.
47. Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (reversing a Ninth Circuit opinion in a case
involving two Californians using and cultivating marijuana for medical purposes
under the language of California's CUA, where the Court, in a 6-to-3 opinion,
found that Congress has the authority to enforce its prohibition against
marijuana-even when facing laws allowing for state-approved, homegrown, non-
commercial marijuana used only for medicinal purposes on a physician's
recommendation, like California's).
48. Id. at 14-15.
49. Id. at 33; see Charles Lane, A Defeat for Users of Medical Marifuana:
State Laws No Defense, Supreme Court Rules, WASHINGTON POST, June 7, 2005, at
AO1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/AR2005060600564.html (echoing the Court's
sentiment that compassionate allowance statutes like California's are vulnerable
and violate federal law); see also Bill Mears, Supreme Court Allows Prosecution of
Medical Mariyuana, CNN.coM, June 7, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/06/Court.medical.marijuanalindex.html
(highlighting the Court's inability to enforce or carry-out its rulings). Essentially,
the Court's ruling in Gonzales v. Raich can be seen as a "rainy day" tool for the
federal government to put in its marijuana enforcement tool-kit-a tool-kit used for
enforcing federal marijuana laws and combating marijuana possession, sale, and
use. Although the Court did not order the federal government to ramp up its
enforcement efforts, it provided them with this tool to use, at its discretion, for
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C. The Obama Administration and the United States Attorney
General
Diverging sharply with the Bush Administration's approach to
enforcing federal marijuana laws regardless of the laws passed by
states, the Obama Administration has recently announced a new
approach to federal marijuana law enforcement efforts.50 The Obama
Administration has essentially instructed the DEA, federal executive
regulatory agencies, and other applicable Justice Department
agencies and officials in charge of enforcing the CSA that (1) federal
laws will be strictly enforced in states which have not passed
medical-use statutes, and (2) in states which have passed medically
based statutes, the federal government will only go after those
offenders who are violating their respective state's statute.5  Taking
the Obama Administration's lead, United States Attorney General
Eric Holder has fallen into lockstep, reflected by his office's
internally released memo, and has stated that his office's approach to
future regulatory and enforcement efforts-or, in other words, to use on a rainy day.
If or when this presidential administration or the next wave of executive branch
officials and agencies decide they want to turn state medical marijuana laws on
their respective heads, this holding legitimizes future federal enforcement efforts,
giving those federal authorities a silver bullet that can be used against state statutes
legalizing marijuana for medical and non-medical purposes.
50. Barrett, supra note 21. In a three-page memorandum generated and
released by the United States Attorney General's Office on October 19, 2009, the
Attorney General's office set forth guidelines for prosecuting and investigating
cases involving marijuana use in states, like California, with medical marijuana
statutes. See MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, supra
note 4 (establishing the United States Attorney General's official policy of
enforcement of federal marijuana laws in states with medical marijuana statutes).
Issued to all the United States Attorney General's offices across the nation, this
memo instructs prosecutors that it is not a good use of their time to arrest people
who use or provide medical marijuana in strict compliance with state laws in states
with medical marijuana statutes. Id. The guidelines issued in this memo do,
however, make it clear that DEA agents and federal prosecutors will still pursue
people whose marijuana distribution or consumption goes beyond what is permitted
under their respective state law, and those who use medical marijuana as a cover
for other crimes. Id. The new policy is a significant departure from the Bush
Administration's, which continued to enforce federal anti-pot laws regardless of
state codes. Barrett, supra note 21.
51. MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, supra note 4.
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enforcement will essentially mirror the above-mentioned Obama
approach.52
D. The California Attorney General
In August 2008, California's ultimate law enforcement authority,
California Attorney General Edmund Gerald (Jerry) Brown, released
his office's "Guidelines for the Security and Non-Diversion of
Marituana Grown for Medical Use."53 In this memorandum,
Attorney General Brown takes the heat off of California medical
marijuana users. 54 Although his memo is not law, it articulates the
California attorney general's approach to how the law will be
enforced by his office.s" The memo asserts that the spirit of
California's CUA was to allow for marijuana to be used in legitimate
instances of medical need.56 Guided by the spirit of the law, the
memo asserts that Californians who follow the stipulations attached
to the California medical marijuana law will not face prosecution by
the State. Exemplifying the confusion generated by California's
medical marijuana law, the California attorney general office's memo
not only acts as a guide for marijuana-using Californians, but also
plays the dual-role of a kind of policy guide or model set of rules for
52. Although the statements released by the Obama Administration and the
memo released by the United States Attorney General's Office do not hold the
same strength, weight, and endurance as official laws, their statements essentially
act as a collective articulation of the federal government's policy or official stance
on enforcing the federal marijuana law against offenders in states with permissive
medical marijuana use statutes. Id. This methodology asserts a "prioritization
approach" which recognizes the federal government's limited resources and
allocates those scarce resources to enforcing against the most egregious offenders
first. Id.
53. See GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION OF MARIJUANA
GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE, supra note 4 (establishing the California Attorney
General's official policy of marijuana enforcement in the state of California).
54. See id. (providing a safe harbor for Californians who are not in violation
of California's CUA).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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local enforcement authorities to use in crafting policies and strategies
for street-level enforcement.
IV. HISTORY OF MARIJUANA LAWS
A. Federal Law
The governing federal law related to the use, sale, or possession
of marijuana is found in the CSA.59 Enacted by Congress in 1970 as
part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
the CSA enabled legislation giving enforcement authority to the DEA
and regulatory authority to the FDA.6 0 Establishing a hierarchy of
schedules, these executive agencies are charged with both the
scheduling and enforcement of the CSA, with enforcement efforts to
be supplemented by the United States Justice Department and the
United States Attorney General.61
As mentioned above, marijuana is currently slotted as a Schedule
I substance - the most dangerous type of substance recognized by
Congress under the CSA.62 Under the CSA, possession of marijuana
is a misdemeanor and cultivation is a felony, and there are no
exceptions carved out for the use, possession, or sale of Schedule I
substances for medical purposes under the federal scheme.6 3
B. California State Law
The present state of California's medical marijuana statute has
come to fruition through two main developments: (1) the passage of
Proposition 215 (Prop. 215), the Compassionate Use Act of 19 9 6 ,6
58. Id.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
61. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-12 (2006).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)-(b) (2006).
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006). Proposition 215
(Prop. 215), the California Compassionate Use Act, was enacted by the voters and
took effect on November 6, 1996. Id. The law removes criminal penalties for
personal use, possession, and cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes by
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and (2) the passage of California State Senate Bill 420 of 2003.65
Together, these are commonly known as the CUA.
California's Prop. 215 was a trailblazer for state medical
marijuana statutes, the first officially legislated and instituted one in
the nation.6 6 In 2003, as an addendum to Prop. 215, California State
Senate Bill 420 was seen as a compromise between patients'
advocates and law enforcement, clarifying some of the vague and
ambiguous language of the CUA.67
patients (and their designated "primary caregivers") that have a physician's
recommendation/approval. Id.
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7-.83 (West 2006). Senate Bill
420 went into effect on January 1, 2004. Id. This law broadens the scope of Prop.
215 to include the allowance of transportation and the protection from punishment
of other offenses in certain circumstances, allows patients to form medical
cultivation "collectives" or "cooperatives," and sets limits on how much marijuana
patients may have. Id. The law also establishes a statewide, voluntary
identification card system, which is supposed to be furnished by county health
departments. Id. Patients with state identification cards are supposed to be
protected from arrest if they follow the specified quantity limits. Id.
66. See Jessie McKinley, Push to Legalize Marijuana Gains Ground in
California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/us/28pot.html (illustrating that there are many
interest groups and advocates within the state of California pushing hard for
marijuana to be fully legalized for both medical and non-medical purposes).
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7-.83 (West 2006). Senate Bill
420 includes controversial state guidelines regarding the quantity of how much
marijuana patients may grow and possess without being subject to arrest. Id.
Further, it requires counties to implement voluntary patient identification card
systems and requires counties to install other mechanisms to protect patients and
their caregivers from arrest. Id. These hotly disputed guidelines, opposed by
patients' advocates for being too restrictive, allow patients up to six mature or
twelve immature plants and up to one-half pound of dried, processed marijuana.
Id. Patient advocates had pushed for more liberal guidelines, but the final
guidelines were decided in a last-minute legislative deal between then-California
Attorney General Lockyer and California State Senator Vasconcellos. See Scott
Imler, Medical Marijuana in California: A History, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-oew-gutwillig-imler6-
2009mar06,0,2951626.story (discussing the evolution and negotiations that took
place prior to the passage of the 2003 amendment to the CUA).
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V. MARIJUANA LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
Since the CUA was passed in 1996 and further amended in 2003,
how is the state of California regulating or enforcing the parameters
delineated in this legislation? The short answer is that, for all
practical purposes, California is not. Instead, the mechanisms for
regulating and enforcing the CUA are extremely informal and not
clearly defined.
The only substantive ground-level regulation comes from the
California Department of Public Health (DPH).68 Accordingly, the
overall administrative regulatory methodology for overseeing the use
of medical marijuana in California can be described as follows: it is a
loose amalgamation of (1) the California DPH keeping track of and
registering medical users,69 (2) the unchecked discretion of California
state doctors, 70 and (3) self-regulation by users choosing the type
they buy based upon their own personal tastes, their own experiences
with particular types and dispensaries, and from word-of-mouth in
the pot-smoking community. 71
68. California Department of Public Health, Medical Marituana Program,
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/mmp/Pages/Medical%20Marijuana%20Program
.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
69. Id. The Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) was established by the
California Department of Public Health as a way of providing a voluntary medical
marijuana identification card and registry program for qualified patients and their
caregivers. Id. The web-based registry system allows law enforcement and the
public to verify the validity of qualified patient or caregiver's cards with respect to
who is legitimately authorized to possess, grow, transport and/or use medical
marijuana in California. Id. To facilitate the verification of authorized
cardholders, the verification database is available on the Internet at
www.calmmp.ca.gov. Id. The MMP is administered through a patient's county of
residence. Id. Upon obtaining a recommendation from their physician for use of
medicinal marijuana, patients and their primary caregivers may apply for and be
issued a Medical Marijuana Identification Card (MMC). Id.
70. See American Medical Association, Medical Ethics, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amalpub/physician-resources/medical-ethics.shtml (last visited Mar. 20,
2010) (providing a cursory overview of the role the American Medical Association
plays in establishing a code of ethical conduct and setting standards for medical
healthcare professionals).
71. Interview with John Doe, Medical Marijuana Patient and Card-Carrier, in
Long Beach, Cal. (Nov. 25, 2009). In an interview with a close friend, I was
informed that the single greatest and most effective regulator impacting patients'
purchases of marijuana at local co-operatives and dispensaries is essentially the
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With regard to the California DPH, the administrative
mechanisms currently in place to regulate the CUA's legalized
medical marijuana program are encapsulated by the DPH's Medical
Marijuana Program (MMP). 72 However, the state of California only
goes half-way with respect to the full scope of traditional state
administrative functions, responsibilities, and roles (often including
heavy oversight and regulatory roles). While the California DPH
registers and keeps track of medical users, it does not check for
quality control or even attempt to regulate nutritional integrity or
consistency of the actual substance. In other words, nobody in
California is performing the function traditionally performed at the
federal level by the FDA. Whereas the FDA monitors substances
that are available for consumption-checking them for safety,
sanctioning violators, and installing informational conduits to warn
the public of dangerous substances-there exists no analogous safety
net for California consumers of medical marijuana. 74  Short of
fulfilling the role of an abacus keeping track of those qualifying as
patients, the DPH is an otherwise toothless and absent regulatory
presence.
Second, with respect to the role doctors play in the issuance of
medical marijuana in California, the CUA both draws a clear
distinction between doctors writing formal prescriptions and merely
giving "recommendations," and places a substantial amount of trust
and confidence in the discretion and judgment of the state's medical
free-market capitalist system-customer satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with past
experiences. Id.
72. Medical Marijuana Program, supra note 68.
73. See id. (describing the goals and scope of the DPH's regulatory approach
with its MMP).
74. Id. A system or a structure has been established in order to issue cards,
register patients, and collect applications fees. Id. However, considering that the
CUA is slotted under the Health & Safety Code of California's legislative scheme,
the DPH's regulatory and administrative approach seems to ignore or overlook the
most paramount health and safety concerns associated with the use of marijuana-is
the actual substance being sold safe for consumption, and what are the ingredients
or substances used in the cultivation of the plant? Recognizing the obvious fact
that marijuana is far from a homogenous product and comes in a variety of
strengths, potencies, ingredients, and strands, I feel there are many issues the state
of California and the DPH are either not considering or has chosen to ignore,
burying their heads in the sand.
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professionals. 75 As a practical matter, due to the dearth of details and
specifics in the language of the CUA, doctors' discretionary
recommendations have essentially been treated as gospel and have
been left unchecked and unchallenged by any type of regulatory
authority.76  For example, while over 1,500 California physicians
have recommended patients be treated with medical marijuana under
the CUA, none have been federally prosecuted for doing so. This
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006); Medical
Marijuana Program, supra note 68.
76. See California NORML, Medical Cannabis Practitioners,
http://www.canorml.org/prop/215physicians.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010)
(demonstrating the scope of the unchallenged discretion many California doctors
have experienced under the CUA's legislative scheme).
77. See id.; see also Safe Access Now, California Referring Physicians,
http://www.safeaccessnow.net/doctors.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (echoing the
findings of California NORML that California doctors have been left essentially
unchallenged by the federal government in issuing their recommendations for users
of medical marijuana). While the fact that 1,500 physicians have recommended
marijuana without being federally prosecuted might easily lead to the conclusion
that doctors are simply acting within their authority under the CUA and thus none
are deserving of prosecution for improper behavior, it might just as easily lead to
the conclusion that the discretion of doctors in the issuance of medical marijuana
cards is being left unchecked and unregulated. Id. The facts on the ground, and the
rampant ease with which medical recommendations are obtained, seem to support
the latter, as the actions of certain doctors certainly do not seem focused on the
patient's health. See How Easy Is It to Get a Medical Marijuana Card?, NBC San
Diego (May 22, 2009), available at
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/health/HowEasy Is ItToGetAMedical_
Marijuana Card _San Diego.html (demonstrating just how easy it is for nearly
anybody to get a marijuana card if they desire). The facts on the ground reveal two
things: (1) what is considered to be a true medical necessity giving rise for a
medical marijuana recommendation has been substantially watered down since the
Act was passed in 1996; and (2) because of this watering down, the result is an "at-
your-fingertips" type of easy access to doctor recommendations. Id. It appears
California doctors are running rough-shot and manufacturing recommendations that
run counter to the true spirit of the CUA. Id. Although the medical professions are
loosely and independently governed by the American Medical Association's
(AMA) Code of Ethics, many in the medical community argue over the
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the AMA as an enforcement agency, citing its
primary role as a policy-making body more concerned with lobbying and effecting
change at the national level in the health legislation debate than in actually policing
the behavior of medical health practitioners. See Medical Ethics, supra note 70
(providing a cursory overview of the role the American Medical Association plays
in establishing a code of ethical conduct and setting standards for medical
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creates a dangerous climate for both doctors and patients in the state
of California: doctors risk creating an image of being drug dealers
rather than medical health professionals. In fact, when deciding the
seminal medical marijuana case, Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme
Court voiced concerns related to the abuses by a few "unscrupulous
physicians" serving to water-down the meaning of "medical
necessity" under California's CUA.
healthcare professionals); see also Robert M. Wachter, Reorganizing an Academic
Medical Service: Impact on Cost, Quality, Patient Satisfaction, and Education, 279
J. AM. MED. Ass'N 19 (1998) (discussing the importance of the AMA's role in
monitoring behavior in the medical professions and emphasizing the AMA's need
to bolster its image and presence in the medical community).
78. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 33 (2005); see also George J. Annas, Jumping
Frogs, Endangered Toads, and California's Medical-Marijuana Laws, 353 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 2291, 2294 (2005) (discussing the Court's uneasiness with how the
CUA's vague language leaves the door open for doctors to be vulnerable to
corruption and to act contrary to the spirit of the Act, which was to provide access
to those patients in legitimate medical need). In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court in
Gonzales v. Raich reversed the Ninth Circuit's opinion and decided that Congress
has the authority to enforce its prohibition against marijuana, even if the federal
enforcement runs counter to state-approved usage of homegrown, noncommercial
marijuana, used only for medicinal purposes on a physician's recommendation.
Raich, 545 U.S. at 33. Despite California's CUA proclaiming that marijuana is
acceptable for use only for medicinal purposes on the advice of a physician, in
rejecting California's right to make such a proclamation, the Court reasoned that
Congress itself had determined that marijuana is a Schedule I drug, which is
defined as having "no acceptable medical use." See id. at 14-15; see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(b)(1) (2006) (scheduling marijuana as a Schedule I CSA substance). The
Court acknowledged that Congress might be wrong in this scheduling
determination, but the issue in Gonzales v. Raich was not whether marijuana had
possible legitimate medical uses, but rather the focus in Raich was on whether
Congress has the authority to make the judgment that marijuana has no legitimate
uses and to ban all uses of the drug. Raich, 545 U.S. at 14-15. In other words,
setting aside the issue of whether marijuana had been correctly slotted as a
Schedule I substance, the Court affirmatively said the federal government has the
power to establish the CSA's hierarchy of schedules and that the federal
government has the authority to slot marijuana, or any other substance, under the
CSA's scheduling regime as federal discretion dictates. Id. Surprisingly, the Court
was more interested in the role of California doctors in the whole marijuana
debacle-being more intrigued and suspicious of the fact that the only limitation on
the discretion of California doctors was the requirement that a physician's
recommendation be made on the basis of a medical determination that a patient has
an "illness for which marijuana provides relief." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2006). The Court's discussion of this limit may be the
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Thus, the present state and the scope of California's CUA is at
the mercy of doctors, their pens, and their "recommendation" pads.
Even though the CUA was passed by California lawmakers, those
lawmakers, through their vagueness and lack of specificity in drafting
the Act, forfeited all authority and control over to California doctors.
The Act is so poorly worded and has been so poorly regulated and
enforced that doctors have essentially taken over, grabbing the reins
and playing key roles in both shaping policy and also dictating the
practical implementation of the Act. However, in Gonzales v. Raich,
the Court tugged back when it voiced its concerns and suspicions
about "unscrupulous physicians" in the state of California." With no
most interesting, disturbing, and pertinent aspect impacting the medical marijuana
debate in California. Instead of concluding that physicians should be free to use
their best medical judgment and that it was up to state medical boards to decide
whether specific physicians were failing to live up to reasonable medical standards,
the Court took a totally different approach. Raich, 545 U.S. at 31. In the Court's
words, the broad language of the California medical marijuana law allows "even
the most scrupulous doctor to conclude that some recreational uses would be
therapeutic. And our cases have taught us that there are some unscrupulous
physicians who overprescribe when it is sufficiently profitable to do so." Id. The
CUA defines the category of patients who trigger the exemption from criminal
prosecution as those suffering from cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain,
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, and "any other chronic or persistent
medical symptom that . .. substantially limits the ability of a person to conduct one
or more major life activities . .. [or] if not alleviated, may cause serious harm to the
patient's safety or physical or mental health." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.7(h)(12)(A)-(B) (West 2006). Although these limits are hardly an invitation
for unbridled and unchecked recreational-use recommendations, the Court cited
two cases to support its "unscrupulous physicians theory," cases involving criminal
prosecutions of physicians for acting like drug dealers; one from 1919 and the other
from 1975. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 31 (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122
(1975), and United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919)). Essentially, by
drawing analogies to these earlier cases, the Court felt entitled to its suspicion of all
parties involved in the California medical marijuana market, reasoning that because
a few physicians were criminally inclined in the past, it was reasonable for
Congress (and the Court), on the basis of no actual evidence, to assume that many
physicians may be so inclined today. Id. Essentially, the Court was giving itself,
and Congress, license to presume the guilt and greed of doctors. Id. Additionally,
it was not only physicians that the Court found untrustworthy, but sick patients and
their caregivers as well. Id. As the facts on the ground have played themselves out
in reality, the Court's instincts as reflected in its Raich opinion have turned out to
be on-point and accurate.
79. Raich, 545 U.S. at 31.
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real oversight of doctors, the practical translation of the Act is that
for any Californian who wants a medical marijuana card for any
legitimate or fictitious reason, there exists a doctor who ultimately
can be found to provide one.
Third, with regard to the self-regulation by users, with no
substantive regulatory entities in place, free-market economic
principles of supply and demand control.80 Since the concept of
"medical necessity" under the CUA has been watered down to near
meaninglessness, marijuana in the state of California has become less
taboo and is no longer in a full-fledged underground market. '
Rather, it has risen to the level of being a quasi-legitimate market. 82
With that in mind, one of the controlling factors of marijuana
consumer behavior is two-fold: (1) past experiences with particular
dispensaries, doctors, and co-operatives; and (2) past experiences of
others running in the same crowd, culture, and lifestyle passed on via
word-of-mouth.83 With respect to how a patient knows what is
actually in the substance he/she is purchasing, John Doe simply
stated, "When you buy something that is bad or that you don't like,
you don't buy it again, you complain to the dispensary, and you tell
your friends."84 What a painfully simple, obvious, ironically free-
market, and exquisitely capitalistic American concept.
In sum, the situation of medical marijuana regulation in
California is a mess. There is no real full-service administrative
agency monitoring this situation and there are no uniform standards
of enforcement or regulation established at the state level. Filling the
regulatory void left by the language of the CUA are self-interested
California doctors with financial incentives to give out as many
"recommendations" as possible. Because the concept of legalized
80. Interview with John Doe, supra note 71. Doe claimed that the greatest
regulator of the purchase and sales of "medical" marijuana at local co-operatives
and dispensaries is essentially the free-market capitalist system-customer
satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with past experiences. Id.
81. See Adam Tschorn, Marituana's New High Life, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/30/image/ig-potculture30 ("Cannabis is
moving into the mainstream, with fashion, films, TV and politicians
acknowledging it's here to stay.").
82. Id.
83. Interview with John Doe, supra note 71.
84. Id.
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marijuana flies in the face of federal laws, the state of California
cannot depend upon federal administrative agencies to pick up the
slack and fulfill the state's regulatory and enforcement duties related
to monitoring medical marijuana in connection with the CUA. As
such, lacking any uniform state-wide standards or mechanisms for
dealing with medical marijuana, the enforcement methods vary
county to county. Setting problems associated with state and federal
law conflict aside, the problems of county-by-county standards are
obvious and challenging, leading to confusion by both law
enforcement officers/agencies and also medical marijuana users.
What is needed in the state of California is a state-level analog of
the federal FDA. While California has the Department of Public
Health (DPH), the DPH only really serves the administrative function
of tracking users that are already issued medical marijuana cards-it
does not oversee the "recommendation" process, or even attempt to
ensure the safety and quality of the actual substance.8 5 This type of
oversight is desperately needed and is quintessentially the function of
administrative agencies, administrative laws, and administrative
policies. 86 With the DPH essentially functioning only as an abacus
counting medical marijuana users in California, an enormous
administrative and regulatory void is left. This void is primarily
being filled by free market principles and by the discretion of
marijuana-friendly California doctors who have made a healthy profit
off of medical "recommendations." These void-fillers do not have
the health, safety, and welfare of Californians in mind; they simply
will not do.
A. Successes and Failures in California
Now that we have established California's regulatory framework
(or lack thereof) for managing how the CUA operates in reality, what
85. See Medical Marijuana Program, supra note 68 (establishing the DPH's
regulatory role as being limited to collecting application fees and tracking users
who voluntarily register).
86. See United States Food & Drug Administration, What We Do,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (providing an example of
an administrative agency performing the traditional function of overseeing a
particular area of American life).
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has been going well and what has not been going so well since the
Act's passage in 1996?
1. Pros
The current state of marijuana usage under the CUA leads
advocates for medical marijuana to cite benefits to both California
citizens and the State stemming from this legislative scheme. The
strongest arguments or benefits cited or asserted by advocacy groups
fall into the following four categories: (1) easier access for patients in
legitimate medical need of pain relief,87 (2) safer access for patients
faking pain-relief need and instead using marijuana recreationally,88
(3) an increase in state tax revenue coming in the form of tax paid on
the sale of medical marijuana,8 and (4) an implosion of the taboo of
marijuana and the benefits stemming from that.90
a) Easier Access for Legitimate Patients in Need of Alternative
and Effective Pain Relievers
As a practical matter, studying marijuana is extremely difficult.91
However, a flurry of medical marijuana studies began in the late
87. See infra Part V.A.1.a.
88. See infra Part V.A.1.b.
89. See infra Part V.A.1.c.
90. See infra Part V.A.1.d.
91. See JANET E. JOY ET AL., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE
SCIENCE BASE 137 (National Academies Press 1999), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=6376 (discussing the difficulties
surrounding the study of marijuana).
The data on the adverse effects of marijuana are more extensive
than the data on its effectiveness. Clinical studies of marijuana
are difficult to conduct: researchers interested in clinical studies
of marijuana face a series of barriers, research funds are limited,
and there is a daunting thicket of regulations to be negotiated at
the federal level (those of the . . . FDA and the . . . DEA) and
state levels. Consequently, the rapid growth in basic research on
cannabinoids contrasts with the paucity of substantial clinical
studies on medical uses.
Id.
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1980's, and in 1999 eleven independent scientists appointed by the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported that marijuana was effective in
controlling some forms of pain, alleviating nausea and vomiting due
to chemotherapy, treating wasting due to AIDS, and combating
muscle spasms associated with multiple sclerosis. 92
More specifically to the situation in California, although the
aforementioned findings are not conclusively and universally
accepted in the medical community, the modern medical trend cuts
towards finding acceptable and effective medical uses for
marijuana. 93 If we are to accept this modern trend which, at best,
confirms marijuana's legitimate medical value as a pain reliever and,
at worst, brings strong arguments to the table for marijuana's medical
legitimacy, California's legalization of medical uses of marijuana has
been successful at making this type of potentially effective pain
reliever more easily accessible to patients in legitimate medical
need.94
92. See Peter A. Clark, The Ethics of Medical Marijuana: Government
Restrictions vs. Medical Necessity, 21 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 40, 42-48 (2000)
(articulating some rough scientific findings as to some purported medical uses for
marijuana portending to be legitimate); see also JoY, supra note 91, at 137
(establishing the IOM's independent findings and articulating some concrete
medical uses they found for marijuana).
93. JOY, supra note 91, at 138.
94. Even if your complaint is that the practical realities stemming from the
implementation of the CUA have yielded over-inclusive results (in that too many
illegitimate patients who do not truly need the relief are being "recommended" the
substance), it cannot be ignored that lying in that over-inclusivity are patients
legitimately in need and whose needs are being more easily met by the existence of
an above-ground, legal supply of "medicine." However, the dilution of the CUA's
true spirit of pain relief cannot be ignored. In fact, according to a study conducted
by the California Police Chiefs Association, despite the claims that medical
marijuana usage stems primarily from critically ill Californian's, only about 2% of
those using crude marijuana for medicine are critically ill (suffering from
HIV/Aids, cancer, or glaucoma). MICHAEL REGAN, CAL. POLICE CHIEFS ASS'N,
CALIFORNIA POLICE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION POSITION PAPER ON THE
DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA (2009),
http://www.califomiapolicechiefs.org/nav-files/marijuana files/files/CPCAPositi
on Paper DecriminalizationMarijuana.pdf. Instead, the vast plurality (about
40%) of those using crude marijuana as medicine are young (age 21-30), have no
critical medical condition, and are using the substance for the sole purpose of being
under the influence of THC. Id.
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b) Safer Access for Fakers
The original spirit and purpose of the CUA was to facilitate easier
access for patients in true medical need of an alternative and effective
pain reliever.95  Despite the current state of medical marijuana
"recommendations" effectively diluting the true meaning of "medical
necessity" in California, a silver-lining might be found. Even those
"patients" manipulating, abusing, and gaming the system with
fictitious medical ailments-those who are treating medical marijuana
not as a medicine but as a recreational drug-presently have
unprecedented, and arguably safer, access to the substance in
California than ever before. 96
However, this is a hollow and possibly illusory victory because,
essentially, California has traded one bundle of problems for
another. 97  Although it appears safer for marijuana users to acquire
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006).
96. See How Easy Is It to Get a Medical Marijuana Card?, supra note 78
(demonstrating just how easy it is for nearly anybody to get a medical marijuana
card if they desire); see also Kenny Mack, How to Get A Prescription For Medical
Marijuana In California, EHow.COM,
http://www.ehow.com/how_2117436_prescription-medical-marijuana-
califomia.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (delineating a step-by-step manual for
successfully obtaining a medical marijuana card in California-instructing potential
patients of where to go, what to say, and any other pertinent details).
97. MICHAEL REGAN, CAL. POLICE CHIEFS Ass'N, PRESENTATION AT THE
CALIFORNIA POLICE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION SUMMIT ON THE IMPACT OF
CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: DISPENSARY RELATED CRIME (2009),
http://www.califomiapolicechiefs.org/nav files/marijuanafiles/files/DispensarySu
mmitPresentation.ppt. The California Police Chiefs Association asserts that
medical marijuana dispensaries come with serious baggage: some staggeringly
negative crime-related externalities. Id. Depending upon the group presenting,
collecting, and compiling the statistical data for marijuana-related crimes in
California, oftentimes the numbers vary dramatically, or the same numbers can
even be spun and manipulated in order to cut towards or lead to irreconcilably
opposite conclusions. Id. For example, one camp of thinkers states that, legal or
not, certain people are going to use marijuana and that legalizing it makes it as safe
as possible - avoiding underground drug operations and drug deals where guns,
distrust, and bullying are often involved. Id. This camp believes easier access
reduces the crime strictly associated with marijuana's underground market. Id.
Although, at first glance, this is a fair and reasonably valid argument, it seems to
miss the big picture. Another valid argument comes from the law enforcement
camp - pointing out that although there is safer and easier access to marijuana via
local dispensaries and co-operatives (essentially eliminating the full-fledged
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the substance (in that they no longer have to go "underground" to
drug dealers or shady suppliers), the crime rate at and around
dispensaries has increased steadily state-wide in California in recent
years.98 It must be acknowledged, however, that these statistics vary
from county to county: some counties lean towards increases in both
dispensary-related crime and marijuana-related crime in general,
while other counties lean towards decreases in both areas.99 The
discrepancy and inconsistency in the statewide trends can be
attributed to a variety of factors (and speculators provide many).
However, the two most prominent factors seem to be (1) a particular
underground market), new marijuana-related crimes have risen from the ashes of
the recently extinguished old-forms of marijuana crimes. Id. The negative
externalities of this quasi-above-ground marijuana trade are that crimes around
these dispensaries have boomed - with both card-carrying patients being mugged
and robbed for their marijuana and money, and also with dispensaries and co-
operatives being robbed frequently for their money and product by people seeking
to both use and sell those products. Id.; JON E. Cox, DIXON CITY COUNCIL,
SUMMARY REPORT DIXON CITY COUNCIL MEETING (2009),
http://www.ci.dixon.ca.us/agendas/past-ccagendas/082609/6-1%20SR.pdf.
98. See Cox , supra note 97 (providing a survey of two major metropolitan
centers in California, the city of San Francisco and the city of Los Angeles, with
respect to recent trends in dispensary-related crimes). For example, from January
2006 to February 2007, the city of San Francisco experienced the following crimes
at, or in close proximity to, dispensaries: 3 homicides, 2 attempted homicides, 6
possessions of firearms, 57 robberies, 27 attempted robberies, 98 aggravated
assaults, 144 batteries, 7 batteries on a police officer, 1 forcible rape, I attempted
rape, 3 sexual batteries, 198 burglaries, and 2 attempted burglaries. Id. Similarly,
in that same time frame, the Los Angeles Police Department reported a 200%
increase in robberies, a 52% increase in burglaries, a 57% increase in assaults, and
a 130% increase in auto burglaries near cannabis clubs. Id. The trends which are
less consistent are those calculations pertaining to general marijuana-related crimes
(regardless of the proximity to dispensaries/co-operatives). Id. However, because
there are so many competing studies out there, and because there is no one
reputable group in charge of acting as a watchdog to ensure the validity and
integrity of these numbers and statistics, the potential risk for "junk-science" is
high and the consistency and pertinence of these numbers comes into question for a
variety of reasons. Id.
99. See id. (demonstrating counties with increasing trends of dispensary-
related crimes); see also Angela Macdonald, Crime Down in States with Medical
Marijuana Dispensaries, EXAMINER.COM, Aug. 27, 2009,
http://www.examiner.com/x- 1 7593-NORML-Examiner-y2009m8d26-Crime-
down-in-states-with-medical-marijuana-dispensaries (discussing counties with
decreasing trends of marijuana-related crimes).
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county's ideological approach to marijuana, 00 and (2) the manner in
which crimes are categorized and calculated in particular counties.10'
With these types of obstacles impeding the flow of reliable
information, it is difficult to know which numbers to trust.
In sum, the situation in California creates sort of a middle market
or a quasi-legitimate universe between a black market and a truly free
and open market. However, this sort of middle-ground market cuts
both ways: on the one hand it eliminates all of the crimes
traditionally associated with an underground market for a product; on
the other hand it raises a number of new negative externalities. In
this case, the externalities include dispensary-related crimes,
potential increases in health/substance abuse problems, and potential
increases in law enforcement efforts and expenses, just to name a
few. However, because the federal government is not fully on-board
100. While some of the more conservative counties have reacted with
prescriptively ramped-up enforcement efforts in order to combat the now-pervasive
marijuana use in California, other more liberal counties have taken stances of
essential non-enforcement of any type of marijuana-related laws (these liberal
counties appear to recognize that California is in direct conflict with the federal
government and seem to be waiting for this conflict to be resolved before taking a
firm position on the issue). See Figueroa, supra note 10 (demonstrating San Diego
county's ramped-up, conservative policy of cracking down on all marijuana related
crime enforcement); see also Tamara B. Aparton, Marijuana Enforcement Can Be
Tricky for City's Police, SAN FRANCisco EXAMINER, Aug. 11, 2009,
http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Marijuana-enforcement-can-be-tricky-for-citys-
police-52925162.html (illustrating San Francisco's liberal policy of almost-non-
enforcement of marijuana laws). Therefore, much of the marijuana-related crime
statistics are heavily dependent upon the loose policy positions articulated by
particular city councils or chiefs of police, which is all very inconsistent and
amorphous.
101. The Dixon City Council Meeting Summary Report provides great
examples of how the calculation methods at the various county levels impact the
statistical analysis statewide.
Attempts are being made to gather further statistics on the impact
of dispensaries. This information has been difficult to obtain
because agencies that have a dispensary in their jurisdiction
many times do not want to break-out this specific information,
and there is a general impression by these agencies that crimes in
and around dispensaries are under-reported due to the belief that
dispensaries do not want to draw attention to their operations.
Cox, supra note 97.
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with the concept of medical marijuana, the numbers remain fuzzy,
unchallenged, and manipulated. There is no real arbiter or official
voice to step in and parse out the truths from the mistruths and to
establish some uniformity in crime reporting standards to really
figure out what is going on here. This role is traditionally filled by
the federal government's executive branch, usually an administrative
agency like the DEA or the FDA.
c) Increased Tax Revenue
Although it is difficult to pinpoint an exact number due to the
underground nature of much of California's marijuana market, recent
estimates postulate that the entire California marijuana industry (both
medical and non-medical marijuana) is a $14 to $16 billion a year
industry.102  According to California State Board of Equalization
(BOE) Chairman Betty Yee, in 2009 California collected $18 million
in sales tax from medical marijuana dispensaries.1 03 Yee further
estimates that an entirely regulated pot trade, for both medical and
non-medical purposes, would bring in $1.3 billion in sales tax
revenue per year.104
These sales tax revenues are generated by exactly that-sales.
Chairman Yee's estimated figure of $18 million in sales tax
collections is generated from the roughly $200 million in reported
medical marijuana sales that are subject to sales tax in California.os
However, with marijuana's overall sales (for both medical and non-
medical purposes) being estimated at roughly $15 billion in 2009,
marijuana is California's biggest cash crop, "dwarfing the state's
second largest agricultural commodity-milk and cream-which brings
102. See Karl Vick, In California, Medical Marijuana Laws are Moving Pot
into the Mainstream, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 12, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/11/AR2009041100767.htmI (providing estimates of
the size, scope, and earnings potential of a completely unregulated marijuana trade
in California).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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in $7.3 billion a year, according to the most recent USDA
statistics."l 06
These current numbers and estimates are evidence of the
tremendous gains the California marijuana trade has made towards
legitimizing itself and rising to join the other above-ground
California industries in the last few years. For example, in a 2006
report prepared by California NORML head Dale Gieringer and
Oakland Civil Liberties Alliance board member Richard Lee, using
the city of Oakland as a template and example, some estimates were
generated with respect to potential tax revenue from medical
marijuana sales in Oakland and the nation as a whole.10 7 According
to the data, the state's medical marijuana patients were, at the time,
consuming somewhere between $870 million to $2 billion worth of
pot a year, which would translate to somewhere between $70 to $160
million in state sales tax revenue, the authors estimated. 08 However,
as the report cited, the state treasury was receiving nowhere near that
amount because many dispensaries were not, at the time, paying sales
taxes or keeping financial records that could be used against them in
a federal investigation. 109 Adding to the problem of collecting taxes,
both at the time and now, is the fact that some dispensaries and
106. See Alison Stateman, Can Marijuana Help Rescue California's
Economy?, TIME, Mar. 13, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1884956,00.html (providing
estimates of total marijuana sales, for both medial and non-medical purposes, for
2009).
107. See Dale Gieringer & Richard Lee, OAKLAND MEASURE Z OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE, REVENUE & TAXES FROM OAKLAND'S CANNABIS ECONOMY (2006),
http://www.canorml.org/background/OakZFinancialReport.pdf; see also Office of
Applied Statistics, SAMISA (DHHS): National Household Survey on Drug Abuse,
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm. While the report focused on Oakland,
which has seen medical marijuana revenues and the taxes derived from them
decline dramatically since the city tightened regulations on dispensaries in recent
years, it also looked at state and federal data to attempt to draw a statewide picture
of the size of the therapeutic cannabis industry. Gieringer & Lee.
108. Gieringer & Lee, supra note 107.
109. See Medical Marijuana: California Begins Taxing Dispensaries,
STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG,
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/481/california taxes medical marijuana dispe
nsaries (noting that "[s]ome club owners welcome taxation as part of the
'normalization' of medical marijuana. But others worry that any tax information
they submit could be used against them by federal drug enforcement agents.").
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patient advocacy groups were arguing that non-profit collectives and
co-ops should be exempt from taxes.1 10
The $18 million in sales tax revenue collected in the recent fiscal
year from dispensaries cited by Yee can, in large part, be attributed to
the recent shift in the attitudes of dispensary owners. More recently,
many dispensaries are chomping at the bit to pay taxes, viewing their
payment of taxes as symbolic and as an irrefutable representation of
their business' legitimacy."' In that spirit, more taxes are voluntarily
being paid-dispensaries are no longer actively eluding the payment
of sales tax-on the sales of medical marijuana.' 12 Medical marijuana
advocates estimate that the aggregate annual sales tax revenue that is
paid by the approximately 400 dispensaries in California is $100
million.1" 3 Although that figure does not match up with the estimate
provided by the California BOE, the agency that collects sales taxes,
the BOE desperately wants to protect that revenue stream:"14
110. California NORML (The National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws), Americans for Safe Access, and Patients Out of Time are
examples of marijuana patient advocacy groups. Additionally, many dispensaries
morph into co-operatives in order to avoid the payment of sales tax. Id. While the
distinction between a dispensary and a co-operative is very real, many are
manipulating the system purely for the purpose of avoiding taxes, and these newly
labeled co-ops do not look, act, or operate like co-ops. Id. Essentially, they are
wolves hiding in sheep's clothing.
111. See Gonzales, supra note 17 (stating that "[m]edical marijuana vendors
hope that their contribution to the state's tax coffers will bolster their legitimacy.")
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.; see also CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, INFORMATION ON
SALES TAx AND REGISTRATION FOR MEDICAL MARIJUANA SELLERS (2007),
http://www.boe.ca.gov/news/pdf/173.pdf (articulating the California Board of
Equalization's (BOE) recent change in policy with respect to the issuance of
legitimate sales/business licenses to medical marijuana dispensaries in order to
facilitate the collection of sales tax from said businesses). Essentially, the BOE's
position paper revealed two enormously important points:
(1) The sale of medical marijuana has always been considered
taxable. However, prior to October 2005, the Board did not issue
seller's permits to sellers of property that may be considered
illegal,
(2) In October 2005, after meeting with taxpayers, businesses,
and advocacy groups, the Board directed staff to issue seller's
permits regardless of the fact that the property being sold may be
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"We view medical marijuana dispensaries as law-
abiding businesses," board member Betty Yee says.
"Many of them have complied with state tax laws.
And when there's aggressive federal action to shut
these businesses down, it's awfully difficult for a state
tax agency like the Board of Equalization to work to
ensure compliance with state tax laws." Yee says this
could be a "make or break" year for medical
marijuana dispensaries, with vendors under constant
pressure from the Drug Enforcement Administration
either through raids or threats of taking action against
their landlords." 5
However, Yee went on to acknowledge that the present situation
in California is extremely murky.1 6 Additionally, IRS employee
Arlettle Lee points out a further wrinkle of complication. According
to Lee, while dispensaries might actually be paying federal tax, there
is not always a paper trail to prove it. 117
d) Imploding the Taboo
If the end goal is to prevent as many young Americans from
using marijuana as possible, the legalization (albeit for medical
purposes) of marijuana under the CUA might actually achieve that
goal. While many will undoubtedly point out that increased
availability of the substance will increase the usage of that substance,
legalization of substances is postulated as potentially having the
opposite practical impact. Rooted in notions of human behavioral
psychology and in a "forbidden fruit" type argument, the legalization
of a previously illegal substance effectively destroys what is
illegal, or because the applicant for the permit did not indicate
what products it sold. This new policy was effective
immediately.
Id.
115. Gonzales, supra note 17.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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commonly known as the "illegal high:" the physical or emotional
high derived from engaging in a prohibited activity purely from its
prohibited status.' 1 8  Or, to approach this rationale from another
direction, although those Californians who already use marijuana
probably use it more now that it is legal, the mere fact that the
substance is now essentially legalized in California will not likely be
the triggering impetus for previous non-users to start using the
substance and, if anything, it will deter those who previously used, or
would have used, marijuana for the sheer "illegal high."" 9
Those who assert this "illegal high" or "forbidden fruit" argument
essentially follow the logic that: (1) there is a camp of people who
are going to use the illegal substance anyway, legal or not, and (2)
there is another camp of people who often try, and continue to use,
illegal substances because of their desire to "rebel" from societal
norms and authority. Those asserting the "forbidden fruit" argument
attempt to isolate the impact of the CUA as not encouraging more
Californians to use marijuana, but rather as shattering the marijuana
118. See Genesis 1:16-17 (stating, "[a]nd the Lord God commanded the man,
saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest
thereof thou shalt surely die."); see also Frosty Woolridge, The War on Drugs
Good for Teens?, RENSE.COM, July 7, 2007,
http://www.rense.com/general77/warondrugs.htm (discussing an interview with
Lansing, Michigan Police Detective Howard Wooldridge).
Wooldridge said, "Prohibition glamorizes the ... drugs. The
forbidden fruit is often thought to taste better than all the rest.
The young teen that tries cigarettes and alcohol thinks, 'Hummm!
Marijuana is illegal so it must be even more fun to use than beer.'
So they try that, too! The good news is that a majority of teens
and adults stop at marijuana; in effect it is the terminal drug for
most. The bad news is that marijuana is especially harmful to a
teen's brain development rivaling the harm of alcohol in a
developing mind."
Woolridge, supra.
119. Cigarettes are legal for Californians age eighteen and older. When you
were fourteen years old, weren't you just a bit curious? Once you reached
eighteen, assuming you are not a smoker, were you a little bit less tempted? What
if cigarettes were to become illegal - a little bit more tempted now? Maybe - some
people are, while some people are not. What about beer? Gambling? Does
illegality stoke any of your forbidden-fruit desires?
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taboo by means of destroying the concept of the "illegal high" or
"forbidden fruit," especially given the fact that virtually any
Californian who wants a medical marijuana card (for legitimate
medical purposes or not) can already get it. 120
2. Cons
Although many allege that taxation of medicinal marijuana will
help balance California's budget problems,121 this concept is
misguided and presents a false economy. Yes, it is true that medical
marijuana dispensaries give the state of California another repository
from which to siphon or collect tax revenue. 12 2 However, this view is
half-sighted and does not take into consideration the foreseen (and
unforeseen) costs associated with the increased prevalence of
marijuana usage in the state of California. Will these negative
externalities offset and engulf the gains made by increased revenue,
eventually overwhelming the California social services system and
generating a net loss for California? History says yes. Simply
because gross revenues will potentially be up does not mean the state
of California will be making a profit on this endeavor-there are other
factors (monetary and non-monetary) to consider when assessing
marijuana's impact on the state of California.
As it currently stands in California, there are four major issues
stemming from California's CUA and the rampant usage (both
medically and recreationally under the guise of medicine) of
marijuana: (1) impact on health, welfare, and social service
systems,123 (2) implications on medical health professionals, 124 (3)
discrepancies in enforcement policies among different California
counties,125 and the (4) impact from a state law directly defying a
federal law.126
120. Woolridge, supra note 118.
121. CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, supra note 114.
122. Id.
123. See infra Part V.A.2.a.
124. See infra Part V.A.2.b.
125. See infra Part V.A.2.c.
126. See infra Part V.A.2.d.
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a) Impact on Health, Welfare, and Social Service Systems
Because the FDA is traditionally charged with regulating
ingestible substances and ensuring that the substances released in the
American market are safe for consumption, does an act like the CUA,
which, as a practical matter, legalizes marijuana for all Californians,
undercut the role of the FDA and bypass them as a regulatory safety
net or filter for keeping Americans safe from dangerous
substances?l 27  Without the FDA performing its gate-keeping
function and acting as the first line of defense against these
dangerous substances, there will be a tremendously negative ripple
effect from these types of substances, impacting California's health,
welfare, and social service systems.
As noted above, with various theories and competing interest
groups out there examining the health implications associated with
smoking marijuana, studying marijuana is, logistically, extremely
difficult and perplexing.128 Accordingly, studies of the short-term
and long-term health effects stemming from marijuana use are
inconclusive and often contradictory.129 As the quintessential sorter
of "junk science," this situation is ripe for FDA intervention.' 3 0
Traditionally acting as an umpire or arbiter in the face of
127. United States Food & Drug Administration, What We Do,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm. The FDA's mission
statement reads:
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by
assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human and
veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, our
nation's food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.
The FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by
helping to speed innovations that make medicines and foods
more effective, safer, and more affordable; and helping the public
get the accurate, science-based information they need to use
medicines and foods to improve their health.
Id.
128. See JOY, supra note 91 (articulating how difficult it is to accurately and
comprehensively study the long and short term effects of a Schedule I illegal drug
like marijuana, due to the substance's dangerous and illegal status).
129. Id.
130. What We Do, supra note 127.
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inconclusive and contradictory findings, the FDA customarily fills
the void, steering an impartial ship with its own independent research
mechanisms. 13 1
Although the topic of marijuana's addictive qualities is malleable
and up for debate, what is unshakably clear is that, aside from
impacting crime statistics, there are historically recognized long-term
impacts and burdens placed on the traditional health, welfare, and
social service systems that inevitably occur when a system must aid
and treat those that become addicted to mind-controlling
substances.132  Such treatments carry considerable costS. 133  If
marijuana is ultimately found to qualify as one of those types of
addictive substances, those costs will substantially burden
California's health, welfare, and social service systems.134
131. Id.
132. See CALIFORNIA POLICE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION POSITION PAPER ON THE
DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA, supra note 94 (discussing some of the non-
health related costs associated with addictive and mind-altering substances).
The use of intoxicating and addictive substances fuels crime and
destroys lives by creating addiction and dependency. Children
are victims of abuse and neglect at the hands of parents or
caretakers who live in addiction. Young adults are particularly
vulnerable to addiction. Relaxed attitudes toward drug use place
them at greater risk of addiction . . . The claim that drug
legalization will eliminate crime associated with drug trafficking
is just not true. Much as we see in the use of other controlled
substances, people who become addicted to Marijuana and
cannot afford to maintain their addiction will turn to crime in
order to supply themselves with their drug of choice. . . Studies
show that attitudes about drugs drive youth drug use rates. By
trivializing and advocating tolerance for illegal drug use, drug
legalization groups send a message to young people that
experimentation with dangerous illegal drugs is acceptable. Drug
legalization would increase the occurrence of drug impaired
driving. Drugs affect concentration, perception, coordination,
and reaction time; many of the skills required for safe driving.
Id.; see also REGAN, supra note 97 (discussing the recent increase in dispensary-
related crimes as an example of other costs).
133. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
134. See CALIFORNIA POLICE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION POSITION PAPER ON THE
DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA, supra note 94 (discussing the negative
externalities associated with the already legalized substances, alcohol and tobacco,
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Although marijuana's addictive qualities are still up for debate,' 3 5
due to the historically monumental costs associated with dealing with
to analogize the impact the CUA's virtual legalization of marijuana will
undoubtedly have, and is having, on California). It is important to note that
America is having an extremely difficult time dealing with its two legal drugs,
alcohol and tobacco. Id. First, about 65% of the population is slotted as regular
alcohol users with this use being attributable to 100,000 deaths per year. Id.
The latest studies show that the U.S. collects about $8 billion
yearly in taxes from alcohol. The problem is, the total cost to the
U.S. in 2008 due to alcohol-related problems was $185 billion,
and the government pays about 38% of that cost (about $72
billion), all due to consequences of alcohol consumption,
according to the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse &
Alcoholism. For every dollar the government collects in alcohol
taxes, it expends about $9 (for such things as Medicare and
Medicaid treatment for alcohol-related health troubles, long-term
rehabilitation treatment, unemployment costs, and Welfare).
Does that seem like a model for emulation?
Bob Stutman, Legalize Maruana for Tax Revenue, BUSINESS WEEK,
http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2009/03/legalizemariju.html.
Additionally, about 35% of the population is slotted as regular tobacco users,
with this use being attributable to 400,000 deaths per year. CALIFORNIA POLICE
CHIEFS ASSOCIATION POSITION PAPER ON THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF
MARIJUANA, supra note 94. More specifically, 100 million Americans have tried
marijuana, but most stopped after one or two times, or after starting a career. Id.
135. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006). While the FDA and DEA, evidenced by their
scheduling of marijuana as a Schedule I substance, consider marijuana to be highly
addictive and habit-forming, many others in the medical health community
vehemently disagree. See id.; see also Stephen C. Markoff, Is Marifuana
Addictive?, THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA MAGAZINE, May 15, 1997, available at
http://www.drugsense.org/mcwilliams/www.marijuanamagazine.com/toc/addictiv.
htm (citing DANIEL M. PERRINE, THE CHEMISTRY OF MIND-ALTERING DRUGS
(American Chemical Society 1996) and Deborah Franklin, Hooked: Why Isn't
Everyone an Addict?, IN HEALTH, Nov./Dec. 1990, Vol. 4, No. 6, at 38). However,
this is an extremely unsettled issue. Further complicating the "addictiveness"
debate is the distinction often drawn between mental and physical addiction.
Markoff, supra, note 135. Additionally, with marijuana being an inherently
inconsistent substance with multiple "species" or types, reaching a conclusive
ruling on the addictiveness of the substance is proving to be extremely elusive. Id.
Markoff's article utilized the independent studies of three doctors (Dr. Jack E.
Henningfield Ph.D. in Psychopharmacology, Dr. Neal L. Benowitz MD of the
University of San Francisco, and Dr. Daniel M. Perrine, Ph.D., Associate Professor
of Chemistry at Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland) testing the addictive natures
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Americans fighting addictions, those making the claim that taxes on
marijuana sales will help to balance California's budget are engaging
in a fiscal shell game. Proponents of this shell game claim credit for
the increased revenue from new taxes on marijuana, but ignore the
costs and burdens on the general social service systems associated
with increased marijuana usage.' 36  This is a false economy.137
Chock-full of logical sleights of hand, these types of "tax-it"
arguments are often deceptive, irresponsible, half-sighted, and, due to
a dearth of hard data and tangible statistics on marijuana's
addictiveness, not yet justifiable.
Thus, although there are only possible negative impacts on
health, welfare, and social service systems related to the use and
abuse of marijuana, because they are in fact possible and the costs
associated with addiction are so great, marijuana's impact must be
considered, especially in light of President Obama promising the idea
of a universal system of American health care (quasi-government run
of alcohol, tobacco, cocaine, heroin, nicotine, caffeine, and marijuana only to have
all three doctors conclude that marijuana displayed substantially fewer and
significantly weaker addictive characteristics than the other five substances. Id.;
see also National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), Marijuana: Facts for Teens,
http://www.drugabuse.gov/MarijBroch/teenpgl3-14.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2010) (citing NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE DIRECTORS,
INC., STATE RESOURCES AND SERVICES RELATED TO ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG
PROBLEMS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE ALCOHOL AND DRUG
ABUSE PROFILE DATA, July 1997). According to NIDA,
Long-term marijuana use leads to addiction in some people. That
is, they cannot control their urges to seek out and use marijuana,
even though it negatively affects their family relationships,
school performance, and recreational activities . . . In 2004, over
298,000 people entering drug treatment programs reported
marijuana as their primary drug of abuse. However, up until a
few years ago, it was hard to find treatment programs specifically
for marijuana users. Now researchers are testing different ways
to help marijuana users abstain from drug use. There are
currently no medications for treating marijuana addiction.
Treatment programs focus on counseling and group support
systems.
Marjuana: Facts for Teens, supra note 135.
136. Gonzales, supra note 111.
137. Id.
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and tax funded health care)."' With a health care expansion bill
looming and near passage in the United States Congress, the health
and wellness of all Americans could potentially become, more so
than ever, of paramount national importance. If the taxpayers are
going to potentially be footing the national health care bill for all
Americans, it is in everybody's best interest to cut through the
murkiness associated with marijuana usage and to find some concrete
answers. Or, in other words, if the health care system is going to
become national and costs are going to be distributed amongst all
Americans, all Americans deserve to be well-informed about the
effects of the substances they are ingesting in order to better
understand the risks being taken and the potential consequences of
those actions.
b) Doctors as Drug Dealers
Is there a fiduciary relationship between a drug user and his
dealer? As articulated by the Supreme Court in its Gonzales v. Raich
opinion, Congress and the Court have both long been concerned with
preserving Americans' confidence in the integrity of doctors and in
the medical health profession in general. 139 However, the legislative
scheme constructed by California lawmakers in the CUA relies
heavily, if not entirely, on the discretion of doctors.140  In an
American health care system where doctors traditionally act as
advisors, advocates, and gate-keepers granting access to the system,
California's design is ripe for corruption and attacks the very
integrity of the system.141 In fact, since the Act's passage in 1996,
the "recommendations" of doctors have been treated as final and their
discretion has been left virtually unchecked and unchallenged by any
138. Currently, there are two health care proposals being crafted in the United
States Capitol Building: (1) the United States Senate's "Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act" (Senate's bill - H.R. 3590), and (2) the United States House
of Representative's "Affordable Health Care for America Act" (House of
Representatives' bill - H.R. 3962).
139. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 31 (2005) (voicing the Court's concerns about the
watering down or dilution of the meaning of "medical necessity" by "unscrupulous
physicians" in the state of California).
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006); Medical
Marjuana Program, supra note 68.
141. Medical Ethics, supra note 70.
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type of regulatory authority.142  The corruption is flagrant and
rampant.
In California, the only thing standing between a patient and a
medical marijuana card is a $50 to $250 office visit1 43 and the
recommendation of a California doctor.'" Instead of installing
142. See Medical Cannabis Practitioners, supra note 76 (establishing that
none of the over 1,500 California doctors to recommend marijuana have faced
federal prosecution); see also California Referring Physicians, supra note 77
(echoing California NORML's contention that there is virtually no oversight of
California doctors). As mentioned above, while over 1,500 California physicians
have recommended medical marijuana under the CUA, none have been federally
prosecuted for doing so. California NORML, supra note 76. To demonstrate the
watering down of the term "medical necessity" that has occurred, only 2% of
California patients receiving recommendations actually suffer from the serious
medical conditions enumerated in the Act (HIV/Aids, cancer, and glaucoma), even
though the primary purpose and spirit of the Act was to provide relief for patients
in serious need. CALIFORNIA POLICE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION POSITION PAPER ON THE
DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA, supra note 94.
143. See Peter Hecht, Patients Flock to California Doctors Practicing Pot
Medicine, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 26, 2010,
http://www.sacbee.com/2009/11/08/2313095/patients-flock-to-california-
doctors.html ("Doctors argue over whether the recommendations, costing anywhere
from $50 to $250 each, go to patients who truly need medical marijuana or help
facilitate recreational drug users and provide hefty profits for the doctors writing
the notes.").
144. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006).
To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain
and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is
deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician
who has determined that the person's health would benefit from
the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS,
chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any
other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
Id. The clause "or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief' has
proven to be especially problematic and has opened up the unbridled floodgates for
certain corrupt California doctors to exercise manipulative discretion and abuse.
Id. In my opinion, the CUA was so poorly worded, and has been so poorly
regulated and enforced, that California doctors have essentially taken over-
grabbing the reins and playing key roles in shaping policy and essentially dictating
the practical scope and contours of the law. The poorly worded, shoddily
regulated, and lazily enforced nature of this California law was astoundingly vague
in its drafting, either by accident or by design. In other words, the state legislature
either wanted to give doctors sufficient breathing room to do what the state
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measures of accountability when crafting the Act, the California
legislature did not put a regulatory or enforcement structure in place
in order to ensure that the spirit of the Act would be maintained.145
Instead of installing any regulatory or enforcement mechanisms, the
California state legislature left a large void in the statutory scheme
and floated this entire piece of controversial legislation on a raft
inflated by the discretion and judgment of California doctors.
This legislative void has been swiftly swallowed up by California
doctors. While prescription writing acts as the traditional mechanism
for holding doctors accountable (both to their own medical ethical
standards imposed by the American Medical Association and to
certain criminal statutes), by merely requiring recommendations
instead of prescriptions, California doctors are able to dodge
traditional conduits of accountability.146  The recommendation
process short-circuits the traditional legal and ethical constraints that
normally manage the American health care system. 147 As a practical
matter, this has created a degradation of Californians' confidence in
medical ethical standards.14 8  With virtually no oversight over
doctors' actions with respect to marijuana, marijuana-friendly doctors
have turned into drug-dealers, flippantly writing "recommendations"
in exchange for the fee charged for a one-time office visit.
In sum, the present state and the scope of California's CUA is at
the mercy of doctors, their pens, their pocketbooks, and their
"recommendations." California doctors are in the driver's seat,
legislature intended to happen (to flatly legalize marijuana use under the guise of
medical necessity), or it was an accident and the legislature truly trusted the sound
professional judgment of doctors and was legitimately trying to get out of doctors'
way in making legitimate professional determinations. However, looking at how
this experiment has played itself out in reality since the Act's passage in 1996, the
theory that the watering down of medical necessity was by design seems more
plausible. This seems more likely because if the Act truly were having unintended
consequences and these results were not desired, the California state legislature
would step in to clarify its language, counter these otherwise unchecked California
doctors, and at least attempt to manage the situation.
145. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006).
146. See Medical Ethics, supra note 70; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11362.5 (West 2006) (establishing the threshold requirement for obtaining
a medical marijuana card is acquiring a doctor recommendation).
147. Medical Ethics, supra note 70.
148. Hecht, supra note 143.
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shaping policy and dictating the scope and contours of California's
CUA. With no real oversight over doctors, the practical translation
of the Act is that for any Californian who wants a medical marijuana
card, there exists a doctor who can ultimately be found to provide
one for any legitimate or fictitious reason.
c) Who's on First?: County Confusion
Setting aside for a moment the issue of the disparity between
state and federal law,14 9 there are stark contrasts and disparities even
at the state level where marijuana enforcement and regulation
policies vary drastically from one county to the next.150 With a lack
of uniform state-wide standards, citizens of California are not always
on clear notice and do not really know if they are complying with the
law.' 5 1
Not only does this disparity create confusion among California
citizens who are marijuana users, it also generates confusion among
California law enforcement agencies.152 Californians, both marijuana
users and enforcers of the law, are unsure of the scope of their
rights.1 53 This county-by-county approach is fragmented, disjointed,
and allows for other, traditionally non-legislative factors to play
substantial roles in shaping the scope of the law.
149. This conflict of laws issue (when federal and state laws are in tension)
and its impact on notice and fairness will be explored in greater depth below when
discussing this tension's impact on Americans' due process rights.
150. See Figueroa, supra note 10 (demonstrating San Diego county's ramped-
up, conservative policy of cracking down on all marijuana related crime
enforcement); see also Tamara B. Aparton, Marijuana Enforcement Can Be Tricky
for City's Police, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Aug. 11, 2009,
http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Marijuana-enforcement-can-be-tricky-for-citys-
police-52925162.html (illustrating San Francisco's liberal policy of almost-non-
enforcement of marijuana laws).
151. See GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION OF MARIJUANA
GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE, supra note 4 (establishing the California Attorney
General's official policy of marijuana enforcement in the state of California).
152. See id. (recognizing the confusion of California marijuana users and law
enforcement agencies alike, establishing a uniform set of enforcement policy
guidelines as a template to correct the discrepancies in enforcement policies of
different California law enforcement agencies, and attempting to address the
questions posed by many California medical marijuana users).
153. Id.
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d) Direct Conflict between State and Federal Laws
California's rebuke of the federal legislative scheme places
tension on the DEA's role as enforcer of federal drug laws, on the
FDA's role as a regulator of substances, and on the United States
Congress' federal lawmaking authority.15 4  California's rebuke of
federal marijuana laws potentially emasculates these federal
regulatory and enforcement authorities at the state level, gutting their
authority with respect to marijuana enforcement and regulation.
Additionally, this climate of disrespecting federal administrative
agencies and casting aside the authority of federal mandates from
Congress portends a reverberation with larger, national
implications.'s When California and other states enact legislation
directly rebuking and defying federal laws, there are a whole host of
negative implications triggered, including: (1) the eroding of respect
154. However, at least with respect to enforcement of federal marijuana laws,
the DEA has stood its ground on a few recent occasions, raiding grow houses and
dispensaries that stand out as some of the more egregious offenders of the true
spirit of the CUA. See Figueroa, supra note 10 (demonstrating recent DEA raids in
San Diego county); see also Hoeffel, All L.A. County Medical Pot Dispensaries
Face Prosecution, District Attorney Says, supra note 10 (reporting on the Los
Angeles District Attorney's recent stance against marijuana in Los Angeles
county); see also Hoeffel, Pot Dispensaries Sue L.A. over Moratorium: Medical
Mariyuana Collectives' Suit Comes as City Struggles to Write a New Ordinance,
supra note 10 (commenting on Los Angeles marijuana users' reaction to the Los
Angeles District Attorney's recent crack-down on marijuana); see also Hoeffel, Los
Angeles County D.A. Prepares to Crack Down on Pot Outlets, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-medical-marijuana9-
2009oct09,0,5210895.story (reiterating the Los Angeles District Attorney's recent
policy position against marijuana). On the other hand, because the federal
government does not recognize any legal or legitimate medical uses for marijuana,
they refuse to invoke the regulatory powers or resources of the FDA, because to
invoke such regulatory oversight by the federal government would be a tacit
admission or ratification of the validity of the CUA's core purpose of recognizing
marijuana's legitimate medical properties. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006). As such, the
FDA stands on the sidelines of the marijuana debate, while the CUA seems to be
having the practical effect of stripping the FDA of all of its regulatory teeth with
respect to marijuana in the state of California.
155. See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L.
REV. 2021 (1987) (articulating the many functional and psychological factors that
are taken into consideration during the law-making process in American society,
while also considering the unique role that unenforced laws play in American
society).
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for authority, (2) issues regarding notice, (3) adverse economic
implications, and (4) the impact on societal morals/values.
First, regarding the eroding respect for authority, having federal
marijuana laws that are not actively enforced and instead ignored
demonstrates flagrant disregard for federal laws, disrespect for the
DEA's marijuana enforcement authority, and insolence for the
FDA's potential marijuana regulation authority. 5 6 This runs the risk
of creating a society with less respect and reverence for law and
order. 57  This creates a slippery slope that potentially fosters a
culture and atmosphere where citizens might become increasingly
willing to violate more serious laws.' 58
Second, with respect to the notice issue, when your state says one
thing, but the federal government comes in and turns the state's law
on its head, who should you as a citizen trust and believe? Among
other things, written laws serve the fundamental function of putting
citizens on notice regarding what is and is not legally acceptable
behavior in society.' 59 Its written form puts citizens on notice of
these rights and expectations.' 60  Accordingly, when there are
conflicting laws, citizens' confidence in the integrity of the legal
justice system is significantly affected.161
Third, with respect to adverse economic implications, by having
an illegal (albeit quasi-legal in California), booming black market
like the marijuana trade thriving in the United States, both the federal
and state governments are leaving a lot of money on the table by not
having a comprehensive regulatory, enforcement, and taxation
scheme in place to tax the activities of this black market. 162 Even in
states with established medical marijuana statutes, like California,
there are inconsistent approaches to issuing cards and a lack of
uniform standards in monitoring the distribution and use of
marijuana, thus creating several loopholes where sales taxes can be
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 140 (Harvard University Press 1986).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Gonzales, supra note 17 (introducing California BOE Chairman
Betty Yee who estimates that a regulated pot trade, for both medical and non-
medical purposes, would bring in $1.3 billion in sales tax revenue).
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avoided.163 Additionally, not only are states missing out on potential
revenue generators, they are left with the other negative externalities,
such as potential increases in costs to state and federal health,
welfare, and social service systems.164
Finally, relating to laws' impact on society's morals and values,
while I do not intend for this article to be a moral judgment on the
use of marijuana, the legalization of substances generally has the
effect of quashing taboos, elevating substances to mainstream
thought and acceptance, and impacting society's moral barometer.' 65
Although it is unclear if laws help to establish or drive the evolution
of society's lowest common moral denominators on particular issues,
or if instead laws act as a reflection of society's already establish
moral norms, laws undoubtedly serve as a fairly accurate social
barometer that communicate to children and the rest of society what
we as a society deem to be acceptable or unacceptable behaviors (or,
if nothing else, what our society deems to be the bare minimum or
lowest common denominator).166 Although commentators argue that
you cannot legislate morality, our laws are a fairly accurate gauge of
society's moral temperature on certain issues.1 67  Do laws dictate
societal morals and values or do societal morals and values dictate
the laws passed? Either way, the two seem to be inextricably
intertwined.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Nachman Ben-Yehuda, THE POLITICS AND MORALITY OF DEVIANCE:
MORAL PANICS, DRUG ABUSE, DEVIANT SCIENCE, AND REVERSED
STIGMATIZATION 59 (SUNY Press 1989) (attaching the passage of laws with the re-
drawing, re-centralizing, and the revitalizing of the "moral universes" or "moral
boundaries" in society - linking the installation of new laws with the establishment
of contemporary societal values).
166. Id.
167. See generally Norman L. Geisler & Frank Turek, LEGISLATING
MORALITY: Is IT WISE? IS IT LEGAL? IS IT POSSIBLE? (Bethany House 1998).
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VI. LOOKING AHEAD & CONCLUSION
As California goes, so goes the rest of the nation.168 Good or bad,
California is generally on the cutting edge and a trend-setter when it
comes to American social and economic legislative policies. As a
leader whose actions could have national implications, California
owes a duty both to its own citizens and to the rest of the nation to
pause and seriously consider everything on the table with respect to
the marijuana debate. With the great number of "pros" and "cons"
attached to the legalization of marijuana, is legalization something
Californians want to encourage and see permeating throughout the
rest of the nation?
The federal government must stop sending mixed signals to the
American public with respect to marijuana. On the one hand, the
United States Congress has passed legislation scheduling marijuana
as the most dangerous type of substance recognized in the United
States.169 However, on the other hand, the United States Attorney
General, the President, and the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration have formally adopted policies of enforcing
Congress' drug laws that essentially serve as ratifications of state
laws, like California's, that practically amount to a legalization of
marijuana.' 70 By adopting these types of enforcement policies, the
federal government's enforcement arm strongly signals its tacit
endorsement or approval of those state legislative schemes, even
when those laws fly directly in the face of federal congressional
mandates.' 7 ' In other words, while our federal legislature is saying
one thing, the enforcement arm for that legislature is adopting
168. See Peter Schrag, As California Goes . . . , THE NATION, Mar. 30, 2007,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070409/schrag ("[W]hat California is, America is
likely to become.").
169. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006) (slotting marijuana as a Schedule I controlled
substance, the most dangerous type of substance recognized under the federal
legislative scheme).
170. See MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE
OF MARIJUANA, supra note 4 (falling into lock-step with the Obama
Administration's policy of respecting state medical marijuana laws, this memo
establishes the United States Attorney General's official policy of essentially not
enforcing federal marijuana laws in states with medical marijuana statutes).
171. Id.
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policies undercutting the legislative mandate by enforcing the law in
a half-hearted manner.
The regulatory and enforcement arms of the federal government
can unilaterally dictate the scope, contours, and impact of a piece of
legislation through the manner in which they choose to regulate and
enforce the law. Usurpation of Congressional lawmaking authority
by the federal regulatory and enforcement arms can be harmful for
two reasons: (1) it runs counter to the voice of the people by short-
circuiting the role of the federal lawmakers who were elected by the
American public to carry out the public's collective will, and (2)
rather than anchoring legislation in concrete and tangible laws, it
threatens to float legislation on policy rafts, rafts often weak and
subject to numerous inappropriate extrinsic influences. 172
If the situation in California is used as both a measuring stick and
a barometer of things to come with respect to the marijuana climate
in America, it is safe to say that the disjointed marijuana mess in
California bodes poorly for America's collective future relationship
with marijuana. The marijuana discussion creates an interesting
wrinkle in the federalism debate-a quintessential debate involving
the perpetual tug-of-war between states and the federal government.
While this debate may be an enjoyable academic exercise in a law
school classroom, it has substantially higher stakes in real life and is
a messy issue.
172. Policy positions are often rooted in political convenience, used as stall
tactics, and temporary in nature. Since policies are not law, they are not rooted in
or bolstered to the firm foundation of the written and recorded word. As such,
these types of lines can easily be washed away by politically-convenient high tides.
Furthermore, mere policy positions establishing how laws will be enforced leave
those subject to those laws unprotected and exposed. Instead of having laws serve
their most basic and traditional function of putting individuals in society on notice
of prohibited activities and establishing societal expectations, policy positions serve
the function of putting those subjected to such laws on notice of merely the current
trends or attitudes of the law's enforcers, essentially putting them on notice of
nothing. In my opinion, in order to protect the due process rights of Californians
and other Americans, and in order to put all relevant parties on fair notice, written
laws must be passed. Mere policy positions cannot carry the day since they are
flimsy and subject to political whims. Rather, truly legitimate approaches to
enforcement should be bolstered by or rooted in some type of clearly defined and
tangible law. A system of enforcement built upon a foundation of policy, rather
than law, is weak, unstable, ripe for corruption and inconsistency, and perpetually
on the brink of collapse.
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Looking ahead with respect to marijuana and defiant state laws,
the federal government has three options: (1) do nothing, (2) enforce
its laws, or (3) reform its approach. As to option one, the federal
government can continue to ignore the disparity between the federal
and state approaches, blindly living with the conflict and allowing
states to craft their own policies, unchecked by federal authority.
Under this option, a state-level analog of the federal FDA would need
to be created by the state of California to regulate the health and
safety of marijuana as a substance being consumed. This is the
federal government's current stance and, as I hope this comment has
delineated, the practical difficulties and pitfalls stemming from this
present strategy make it an unsustainable and ineffective approach.
While ignorance is often bliss, the federal government cannot ignore
this inherently and historically important federalism question, as it
could have a resounding impact on the dynamics of power as
understood between the federal and state governments on issues other
than marijuana. The federal government burying its head in the sand
is not a sound long-term approach.
As to option two, the federal government can ramp-up its
enforcement efforts by unleashing the DEA, invoking the Supremacy
Clause' 73 and overturning state laws that run counter to the federal
mandate. The federal government does have the authority, as
explicitly stated by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich, to
ignore California's CUA because it is in direct defiance of a federal
statute.' 74 However, because the Court grounded much of its opinion
in that case on the scheduling of marijuana (a designation that is now
largely in dispute as more reputable scientific studies surface
indicating that legitimate medical uses of marijuana exist), the
Court's foundation for finding federal authority here might be
crumbling.'7 5  If nothing else, revisiting the process of scheduling
173. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.").
174. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 31 (empowering the federal government of the
United States to vigorously enforce its marijuana laws, even though the Court does
not and cannot mandate that the federal government take action).
175. Id. at 14-15.
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marijuana as a substance under the CSA would be a logical first step
in moving forward under this option.
As to option three, a comprehensive plan for federal reform on
the subject of marijuana in American society can be crafted. In this
case, the DEA and FDA would need to weigh in, states would need
to be included in the conversation, and a re-scheduling of marijuana
would probably occur. The federal government could realistically go
one of two ways in completely overhauling or reforming marijuana
laws nation-wide: (1) the federal government could institute minimal
guidelines, while deferring to the states to come up with suitable
legislative, enforcement, and regulatory schemes in dealing with
marijuana at the ground level, or (2) the federal government could
come up with a uniform approach to regulating and enforcing the
distribution and use of marijuana (for medical and non-medical
purposes), treating it similarly to other prescription drugs and
potentially dangerous commodities such as aspirin, Vicodin and
beer-all of which are subject to FDA regulation and some to other
forms of federal enforcement. Both of these approaches look a lot
like de-criminalization.
Whichever option is chosen, the FDA and DEA must be
reinstituted to their traditional roles as regulators and enforcers. If a
scheme is adopted whereby marijuana will play a more prominent
role in everyday American society, then the FDA will undoubtedly
play a larger role in regulating the quality, content, and safety of the
substance. However, if a scheme is ultimately adopted where
marijuana's place in society is solidified as a Schedule I substance,
then the DEA must sharpen its enforcement teeth and not have its
hands tied behind its back by other executive branch officials. Both
of these administrative agencies play enormously important roles in
keeping Americans safe, healthy, and secure. However, in the
context of marijuana, both agencies are presently being used as
political pawns and bureaucratic paper-weights at a time when their
respective skills and expertise are needed more than ever. It is time
for the powers that be to get off of the policy fence, make some hard
decisions, and take some real action.
The current state of marijuana sales, use, and consumption in the
state of California is analogous to the Underground Railroad of 19th
century America. Whereas the Railroad was an underground
network of secret routes and safe-houses enabling African-American
slaves to get to "free" states and escape slavery, there is a similar
network of safe harbors in place for marijuana-using Californians.
With countless patient advocacy groups and marijuana-friendly
doctors and lawyers flooding the Internet with websites, a climate has
been created in the state of California where anybody who wants a
medical marijuana card (for legitimate medical needs or not) can get
one. 17 6  There are lists of marijuana-friendly California doctors,
broken down and listed alphabetically and by county.' 7 7  There is
even an eHow.com page instructing users on how to procure a
medical card, getting down to the exact details of what to say to
doctors to ensure the receipt of a recommendation.' 7 8
All of these conduits, informational pipelines, and helping hands
readily available to California marijuana users have created a
modern-day Underground Railroad, a Pineapple Express of sorts.179
However, one main difference is that these modern networks hide in
plain site on the Internet. Surprisingly, the stoners are fervently
176. See California Referring Physicians, supra note 77; see also Safe Access
Now, California Attorney Referral List,
http://www.safeaccessnow.net/attomeys.htm (listing marijuana-friendly lawyers in
California).
177. See Medical Cannabis Practitioners, supra note 76 (listing California
marijuana-friendly doctors who openly give out medical marijuana
recommendations - listed alphabetically and by county).
178. See Mack, supra note 96.
179. PINEAPPLE EXPRESS (Columbia Pictures 2008). Pineapple Express is
described on the Internet Movie Database as follows:
Lazy court-process clerk and stoner Dale Denton has only one
reason to visit his equally lazy dealer Saul Silver: to purchase
weed, specifically, a rare new strain called Pineapple Express.
But when Dale becomes the only witness to a murder by a
crooked cop and the city's most dangerous drug lord, he panics
and dumps his roach of Pineapple Express at the scene. Dale now
has another reason to visit Saul: to find out if the weed is so rare
that it can be traced back to him--and it is. As Dale and Saul run
for their lives, they quickly discover that they're not suffering
from weed-fueled paranoia: incredibly, the bad guys really are
hot on their trail and trying to figure out the fastest way to kill
them both. All aboard the Pineapple Express.
The Internet Movie Database (IMDb), Plot Summary for Pineapple Express,
available at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt09l0936/plotsummary (last visited Mar.
31, 2010).
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organized and united. They know the rules and loopholes, they know
how to exploit them, and they are doing a great job at it. They run a
remarkably tight ship. In the War-on-Drugs in the state of California,
the marijuana users are winning. And, in fairness, they should be
winning because they have demonstrated that they care about this
issue more than their opponents. Marijuana users' efforts reveal that
having access to the substance is much more important to them than
keeping the substance out of California is to their opponents.
The stakes here are incredibly high. Marijuana impacts the triad
of social service systems (health, welfare, and social services), tax
revenues, the family structure, crime, and social values, just to name
a few. While the California marijuana market in general is a
potential billion dollar industry, one cannot be automatically enticed
by the false economy that increased tax revenues from this industry
will cover, account for, or cure all the negative externalities that
come along with the increased usage and prevalence of this substance
in our society. 8 0 Marijuana, like any potentially addictive substance
that is abused, would invariably trigger a whole number of societal
costs if brought into the mainstream.' 8 ' Looking at our society's
previous experiments with alcohol and tobacco, and the fact that the
astronomical societal costs attributable to those legal substances are
not even close to being offset by the tax revenues generated from
those substances, both California and the federal government must
tread very carefully when making a decision on how to deal with
marijuana.
If marijuana is legally recognized, just like we cannot un-ring the
alcohol or tobacco bells, it too will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to untangle or unwind. There is essentially no turning
back. Thus, "legalize-it" theorists who base their arguments and
justifications on alcohol and tobacco grounds are ignoring the mess
alcohol and tobacco make in our society-they are overlooking the
180. See Gonzales, supra note 17 (discussing the opinion of California BOE
Chairman Betty Yee who estimates that a regulated pot trade, for both medical and
non-medical purposes, would bring in $1.3 billion in sales tax revenue, and also
explaining the concept of the false economy asserted by those who ignore
marijuana's negative externalities and instead focus only on marijuana's potential
for generating increased tax revenues).
181. See REGAN, supra note 97 (discussing the costs associated with alcohol
and tobacco in America).
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strain those substances place on local, state, and federal governments.
Because it is nearly impossible to make something illegal once it has
already been made legal, before the genie is officially let out of the
bottle, a serious balancing of the "pros" and "cons" must be
undertaken. The time for reflection and action is now. Some
definitive federal action must be taken and something must be done,
because, for all practical purposes, the genie is starting to peek out of
the bottle in the state of California.
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